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A NEW DEAL FOR FIDUCIARIES' STOCK TRANSFERS 
Alfred F. Conard* 
FOR nearly one hundred years, executors and administrators have been struggling with the excessive documentation1 which 
corporations demand as a condition of recording stock transfers.2 
For almost as long, legislatures have been passing laws in the 
hope-generally vain-of alleviating the burden.8 
•Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 Typical documentation for a transfer of stock on behalf of a decedent's estate 
includes: (I) the certificate, assignment, and signature guarantee (as in a non-fiduciary 
transfer); (2) a court clerk's certificate of appointment of the fiduciary; (3) a certified copy 
of the will, if any; (4) a court order authorizing sale or distribution, where the law of 
the state in which the fiduciary was appointed requires the fiduciary to obtain such 
orders; (5) a waiver of inheritance tax from one or more states having contacts with 
the transfer. This article is concerned only with items 3 and 4. 
For an explanation of why the documentation is required •by transfer officials, and 
why lawyers regard it as excessive, see Christy, "Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock," 
53 MICH. L. R.Ev. 701 (1955); Conard, "Simplifying Security Transfers," 30 RoCKY MT. 
L. R.Ev. 1 (1957); Dewey, "The Transfer Agent's Dilemma: Conflicting Claims to Shares 
of Stock," 52 HARV. L. REv. 553 (1939); Reports of Committee on Simplification of 
Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 96 TRUSTS & ESTATES 861 (1957); 95 id. 904 (1956); 94 
id. 835 (1955); 91 id. 765 (1952); Scott, "Participation in a Breach of Trust," 34 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 454 at 465-467 (1921); Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §325 (1956). 
2 The rule .that corporations are liable for failure to police stock transfers by 
fiduciaries was first announced in 1848. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmer's Bank, (C.C. 
Md. 1848) 15 Fed. Cas. 1040. Earlier iEnglish and American decisions were contra: Hartga 
v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jr. 55, 10 Eng. Rep. 891 (1796); Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 
6 Leigh (33 Va.) 399 (1835); Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Mete. (53 Mass.) 421 (1847). 
Although cases reveal that some corporations were still transferring without investigation 
in the 1850's [Wooten v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 128 N.C. 119, 38 S.E. 298 (1901) and 
Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 173 N.C. 365, 92 S.E. 170 (1917)], they disclose a 
fiduciary's suit against a professional transfer agent which refused to transfer without 
proof of rightfulness as early as 1864 [Bayard v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank of 
Philadelphia, 52 Pa. St. 232 (1866)]. 
3 The following acts are the principal acts which were apparently designed to 
alleviate the risks of the security issuer; their effects will be discussed later: 
1874 (Pennsylvania): Act of May 23, 1874, P .L. 222, §1; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) 
tit. 20, §3151 [said to have been a direct reaction to the decision in Bayard v. Farmers' &: 
Mechanics' Bank, note 2 supra, and to •have been superseded by the Uniform Fiduciaries 
Act in 1923. See First Nat. Bank v. Pittsburgh F. W. &: C. Ry. Co., (E.D. Pa. 1939) 31 
F. Supp. 381 at 385]. 
1897 (Delaware): 19 Del. Laws, c. 246, §3; Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 12, §1572. 
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In 1957, at least three states (and possibly four) opened a 
door through which estate representatives can emerge from their 
long bondage.4 For the first time, identical acts were passed in 
different states, and interstate recognition of simplification meas-
ures began.5 For the first time acts were passed which get to 
the root of the transfer agent's problem.6 
The Acts That Failed 
It is not enough to pass a well-intended law. That has been 
done before, with little or no gain. 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act. The most conspicuous failure among 
1918 (Massachusetts): Mass. Gen. Acts 1918, c. 68, §3; Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 203, 
§21. 
1919 (Illinois): Ill. Laws 1919, p. 312; Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 32, §29, 
repealed on adoption of Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 1931. 
1922: Uniform Fiduciaries Act, 9-B U.L.A. IO, adopted by 22 states from 1923 
through 1953. 
1927 (Ohio): Ohio Laws 1927, p. 22, §8623-33; Ohio Rev. Code (Page, Supp. 1957) 
§1701.28. This law was supplemented by related acts in 1931 and 1941, and was radically 
amended and simplified in 19-l!l. 
1929 (California): Calif. Laws 1929, c. 711, p. 1268, §16; Cal. Corp. Code (Deering, 
1953) §2411. 
1947 (Oklahoma): Okla. Laws 1947, p. 123, §118; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1953) tit. 18, 
§1.118. 
1948 (Virginia): Va. Acts 1948, p. 351; Va. Code (1950) §13-105.1, repealed, Va. Acts 
1956, c. 428, §1. 
1953 (Pennsylvania): Pa. Laws 1953, p. 148; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A. 
§§8-401 to 8-404. 
1953 (Wisconsin): Wis. Laws 1953, c. 399, §66; Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1957) §180.85. 
1955 (Connecticut): Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §29lld. 
Other statutes bearing on fiduciary stock transfers are collected in REPORT OF THE 
NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION 183-190 (1937), 
4 The three states, which adopted the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act, 
and the citations, are Connecticut [Conn. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 573], Delaware [Del. Laws 
1957, S. B. No. 287] and Illinois [Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 32, §§439.50-439.57]. 
The fourth state is Massachusetts, which adopted a revised version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Mass. Acts &: Resolves 1957, c. 765. Part 4 of art. 9 of the U.C.C. 
purports to simplify security transfers. Reasons for putting Massachusetts in the "possible" 
category will be given later in this article. 
5 The Illinois and Delaware acts are identical (except for title, repealers, and other 
trimmings); the Connecticut act is substantially like them. 
Although the Massachusetts act of 1957 bears the same name as a Pennsylvania act 
of 1952 (the Uniform Commercial Code), the Massachusetts act is very much changed, 
at least in the transfer simplification provisions (part 4, art. 9). 
On September 3, 1957, Chicago transfer agents began making simplified transfers 
for Delaware corporations on the basis of the Delaware and Illinois acts; Wilmington 
transfer agents ~ave since reciprocated, with respect to Illinois estates. 
6 As later discussion will show in more detail, simplification acts passed before 1957 
generally failed to protect the security issuer against the one or both of the hazards that 
-(a) -the fiduciary lacked power or capacity to transfer, (b) the issuer had constructive 
notice, ~hrough some employee or agent, that the transfer was wrongful. 
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earlier attempts to solve the fiduciaries' stock transfer problem 
is section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, hopefully promul-
gated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1922,7 
and subsequently adopted in 23 states.8 This section was appar-
ently intended to facilitate transfers by relieving corporations 
of some of the risks of transferring fiduciaries' stock.9 
The New York Law Revision Commission saw defects in the 
Fiduciaries Act provisions, and prepared a modified draft of sec-
tion 3.10 This was submitted to the legislature with an exhaustive 
study and a recommendation for passage.11 The law was expected 
to abolish the requirement of all documents other than proof of 
appointment of the fiduciary.12 
The effects of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act on stock transfer 
7 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAws 109 (1922) (hereinafter cited HANDBOOK); 9-B UNIFORM LAws .ANNOTATED 17 (1957) 
(hereinafter cited U.L.A.). 
s The list includes Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois (repealed), Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York (§3 only), North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Washington (§3 only), Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Of the adoptions listed above, Illinois' was repealed in 1957 incidentally to adoption 
of the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act (note 4 above). Washington and New 
York have §3 but no other sections of the act. Ohio, which is commonly listed among 
adopters of the U.F.A., is omitted above because it did not adopt §3. 
The above list of adoptions is taken from 9-B U.L.A. 17 (1957), where citations to 
primary sources may be found, except for the two states which adopted only §3. For 
these, see N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law (McKinney, 1941) §§359i-359k; Wash. Rev. Code (1957) 
§§21.16.010, 21.16.020. 
o Exactly how much simplification the commissioners expected is not clear. T•heir 
broad objectives, applicable to all sections of the act, were stated as follows: "The 
general purpose of the Act is to facilitate the performance by fiduciaries of their 
obligations. . • • In order to prevent occasional breaches of trust, the courts have 
sometimes adopted rules which can easily be evaded by a dishonest fiduciary, but which 
seriously hamper honest fiduciaries in the performance of their obligations. The fact 
that the English courts have substantially adopted the principles here laid down, and 
that these principles have worked well in practice, would tend to dissipate any fear that 
their adoption in this country would result in inadequate protection to beneficiaries." 
HANDBOOK (1922) 337-338; 9-B UL.A. 11. 
A further reference to English practice is contained in the commissioners' note to §3. 
HANDBOOK (1922) 339-340; 9-B UL.A. 17. 
It is clear that under English law and practice the corporation does not inquire 
into the power or authority of the personal representative. See GoWER, MODERN COMPANY 
LAW (1954); GORE-BROWN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES, 41st ed. (1952). 
10 Enacted as N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§359i-359k. The principal departure from the 
Uniform Fiduciaries Act made by the Law Revision Commission was an expansion of 
the statute to include transfers of securities from the name of a decedent. The Uniform 
Act applies only to securities which are already in the name of fiduciary (or, in some 
states, in the name of fiduciary's nominee), having been previously transferred out of 
the name of the decedent. 
llN.Y. LAw REv. COMM. REP. 129-190 (1937). 
12 Id. at 135-136. 
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practice have been very slight.13 It is common knowledge that 
wills, court orders, and supporting affidavits are still required 
almost universally.14 Statistical proof of the UFA's failure re-
sulted from a survey of practices of 93 transfer agents, completed 
by the New York Stock Transfer Association in 1953.15 
The failure of the UFA was most marked in relation to indivi-
dual executors and administrators. Take, for example, the re-
quirement that an executor, appointed in a state requiring a 
court order to sell stock, must present a certified copy of his 
court order to the transfer agent. Where the UFA was not in effect 
in all relevant states, 93 out of 93 transfer agents required a copy. 
Where the UFA was in effect, 87 out of 93 required it.16 Or take, 
instead, the requirement of a certified copy of the will. Where 
the UFA was not in effect, 83 out of 93 transfer agents required 
it from an individual executor. Where the UFA was in effect, 
79 out_ of 93 required it.17 In both instances, the UFA failed to 
affect the great bulk of transfers. 
UFA consequences were only slightly more positive in rela-
tion to corporate fiduciaries-chiefly trust companies-acting as 
executors or administrators. Practice with regard to corporate 
fiduciaries is different for many reasons. Their expertise and 
financial responsibility incline transfer agents to be less demand-
ing of them than of individual fiduciaries; trust companies com-
monly use a form of guarantee when requesting transfer, known 
as the "Standard Indemnity Agreement" ;18 they also commonly 
keep securities in the names of nominees, without disclosing the 
existence of a trust.19 
13 For a monograph on the subject, see KLINGLER, THE UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES Acr: AS 
APPLIED TO CORPORATE SECURITY TRANSFERS IN NEW YORK STATE (1956, !Rutgers University 
Graduate School of Banking thesis). 
14 See authorities collected in note 1 supra. Also David, "T•he Decedent's Securities 
and Their Transfer," I PRACTICAL LAWYER 50 (April 1955). 
15 The results of the survey were circulated in mimeographed form to members 
and associates of the New York Stock Transfer Association on November 27, 1953. The 
;report ,has no title, but will ,be referred to herein as "NYSTA Survey." 
16 NYSTA Survey, QQ. II-I, II-2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 For a description of one trust company's employment of ,the standard indemnity 
:agreement, see Mudge, "The Simplification of Corporate Fiduciary Transfers," 35 TRUST 
'BUL. 20 (Feb. 1956). 
• 19 For an explanation of nominee practice, see Scon, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §179.5 (1956); 
WillialllS, "Easing Problems of Stock Transfer," 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 278 (1956); 73 BANK-
ING L.J. 457 (1956); 35 TRUST But. 34 (April 1956); Rogers and Chinnis, "Stock Transfers 
under the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and Nominee Statutes," 7 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 150 
(1950); THE NOMINEE PROBLEM (1955) (pamphlet issued by American Society of Corporate 
.Secretaries, Inc.). 
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With these variations of practice in mind, it is interesting to 
study the extent to which transfer agents exempt corporate fidu-
ciaries from production of documents. We will take, for an 
example, the certified copy of the will, and note how many of 
the agents required it in the presence or absence of Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, §3 (UFA), and the Standard Indemnity Agree-
ment (SIA), or both.20 
Transfer from corporate Number requiring copy Percent 
executor to purchaser: ( out of number answering) 
without UFA or SIA 81 out of 93 
with UFA but without SIA 70 out of 89 
with SIA but without UFA 59 out of 92 
Transfer from corporate 
executor to nominee: 
without UFA or SIA 
with UFA but without SIA 
with SIA but without UFA 
with UFA and SIA 
75 out of 92 
66 out of 89 
59 out of 92 








The results of these figures can be easily summarized. For 
individual executors and administrators, section 3 of the UFA 
has done practically nothing. For corporate executors and adminis-
trators, it has done a little. But it has done less than they were 
able to do by themselves by adopting a guarantee practice. Even 
combined with other aids, the UFA has not prevented a sub-
stantial majority of transfer agents from demanding full docu-
mentation. 
Miscellaneous State Acts. Another handful of states have or 
formerly had statutes designed to lighten in some way the burden 
of the corporation in completing a transfer. One type of statute 
provides, in general, that a corporation is not bound to see to 
the proper execution of any trust to which the shares may be 
subject; California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, and Virginia have had such statutes.21 
No one has published any detailed study of the practical 
effects of statutes of this type.22 Two of them-Pennsylvania's and 
Illinois'-were superseded many years ago by the Uniform Fiduci-
20 Figures summarized from NYSTA Survey, QQ. II(l), II(2), II(3), IV(l), IV(2), IV(4), 
and IV(3), respectively. 
21 Cited in note 3 supra. 
22 For some relevant comments, see CHRISTY AND McLEAN, TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d 
ed., 1176-387 (1940). 
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aries Act.23 Virginia's seems to have been repealed absent-mind-
edly in the course of adopting a new corporation act.24 Two 
more-Oklahoma's and Connecticut's-are relatively new, dating 
from 1947 and 1955. In Massachusetts, I am told that the statute 
is given some effect, which will be discussed later. In the other 
states, the evidence indicates that the statutes have had little 
or no effect on the documentation of transfers.25 
Another type of statute, illustrated by Delaware,25a provides 
that a security issuer is safe in relying on a court certificate that 
a particular transfer is proper. Since this type of statute merely 
substitutes one type of document for another, it is not a · docu-
mentary simplification. Its value would seem to lie chiefly in 
those cases where the will or trust deed is ambiguous, and a court 
certificate avoids the problem of interpretation. There are still 
other types of acts, but their effects are not significant.26 
Acts That Have Succeeded in Part 
Partial success was achieved by Ohio, which adopted an in-
genious trilogy of acts designed to simplify transfers,27 drawn up 
23 First Nat. Bank v. Pittsburgh F.W. &: C. Ry. Co., (E.D. Pa. 1939) 31 F. Supp. 381; 
Mudge v. Mitchell Hutchins &: Co., 322 Ill. App. 409, 54 N.E. (2d} 708 (1944). The 
Pennsylvania act was probably the •best passed in the United States before 1957, because 
the security issuer was not charged with notice of adverse claims unless notified in writing. 
Its supersession by the Uniform Fiduciaries Act was a step ,backward. 
24 It was repealed by a mass repealer of the former corporation chapter. Va. Acts 
1956, c. 428, §1. 
25 I have decked the transfer requirements as stated in the Stock Transfer Guide 
for all the trust companies of California and Connecticut which are listed by the same 
source as Associate Members of the New York Stock Transfer Association. Oklahoma has 
none. All indicate that they require a certified copy of the will, as well as a court order 
where required by local law, whenever they act as transfer agent. Paradoxically, one of 
them also lists what it requires in transferring stock in itself, and here omits the 
· requirement of certified will copy (Bank of America National Trust and Savings Associa-
tion, Stock Transfer Department, San Francisco). In further confirmation of the California 
. situation, see Mudge, "The Simplification of Corporate Fiduciary Transfers," 35 TRUST 
BUL. 20 (Feb. 1956). 
25a Cited in note 3 supra. 
26 See CHRISIT AND McLEAN, TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 376-387 (1940). 
27 Ohio Rev. Code (Page, 1954) §§1339.02, 2109.29; id. (Supp. 1957) §1701.28. Two 
sections of the legislation involve executors and administrators. Section 1701.28, originat-
ing in 1927, is a portion of the corporation code which provides that a corporation is not 
liable for various types of infirmity in fiduciary transfers, spelled out in great detail. 
It was greatly expanded by amendment in 1949. _ 
Section 2109.29, originating in 1931, is a section of the probate code providing that 
a corporation need not take notice of the requirements imposed by that code upon 
fiduciaries. 
The third section (1339.02) is related to lack of legal capacity of registered owners 
such as minors and incompetents; corporations are not liable for transfers made in 
ignorance of the incapacity. It originated in 1941, and is a part of the "Fiduciary Law," 
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and promoted by trust officer Henry Pirtle of the Cleveland 
Trust Company.28 Pirtle persuaded his fellow townsmen, so that 
all the professional transfer agents of Cleveland now subscribe to 
rules of simplified transfer for intrastate cases.29 But transfer 
agents in Toledo, Columbus, and Cincinnati remain unconvinced 
to this day.30 So Ohio enjoys simplified transfers in one of four 
financial centers, and endures unsimplified transfers in the other 
three. 
A similar history is recorded in Pennsylvania which in 1952 
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 8 of the code 
deals with security transfers, and part IV of article 8 is intended 
to reduce documentation.31 In response to the code, some Phila-
delphia transfer agents have generally eliminated documentation 
on intrastate transfers,32 but Pittsburgh agents have made no 
change in their standard practices.33 
Wisconsin in 1953 adopted a simplification act patterned on 
the language of the Pennsylvania Commercial Code, but exclud-
ing all the other multifarious subjects with which the code deals.34 
Its provisions differ from the code's transfer provisions chiefly in 
that they cover only stock (not registered bonds), and are per-
missive rather than mandatory in form. Apparently the small 
amount of transfer business done in Wisconsin has been effectively 
simplified as a result of this act.35 However, no recognition has 
28 Pirtle wrote the following articles in explanation of the laws which he had 
promoted: "Modification in Ohio of Doctrine that a Corporation is Trustee for its 
Shareholders," 20 Omo OP. 464 (1941); "Further Remarks Concerning the Transfer of 
Corporate Securities in Ohio," 21 Omo OP. 272 (1941); "New Ohio Securities Transfer 
Statute and Conflict of Laws," 22 Omo OP. 539 (1942). 
29 Rules of Cleveland Stock Transfer Association, CCH STOCK TRANSFER GUIDE, p. 
1159. See also under "Transfer Agents' Requirements" for Central National Bank of 
Cleveland, Cleveland Trust Company, National City Bank of Cleveland, and The Union 
Commerce Bank, CCH STOCK TRANSFER GUIDE, p. ll0lff. 
30 Questionnaires sent to various professional transfer agents in these cities were 
not returned. The conclusion stated is based on a telephone conversation with a Toledo 
bank official who did not wish to be quoted, and on hearsay from various sources. Counsel 
for one large Cincinnati corporation-not a professional transfer agent-stated in writing 
their unwillingness to rely on the Ohio legislation. 
31 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §§8-401 to 8-404. 
32 Interview and observation by the author at Girard Trust Company, Philadelphia, 
May 1955; correspondence with Mr. Elliott B. Thomas, member of American Law 
Institute committee on U.C.C., art. 9, of P,hiladelphia. However, a letter dated February 
25, 1958, from another Philadelphia lawyer tells of a large Philadelphia trust company 
which does not make simplified transfers. 
83 Letter of June 12, 1957 to the author, from a vice-president of a major Pittsburgh 
transfer agent. 
u Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1957) §180.85. 
35 Letters to the author from Charles Bunn, Madison, and R. J. Schimmel, Milwaukee. 
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been given to it in other states, and Illinois transfer agents have 
specifically ruled it insufficient for them to rely upon.36 
Massachusetts has a simplification act adopted in 1918 which 
was probably the prototype of section 3 of the Uniform Fiduci-
aries Act. It exonerates a security issuer from responsibility for 
the execution of any trust, but does not apply to "knowingly 
participating in a breach of trust."37 This seems to have led some 
Boston transfer agents to dispense with copies of wills and trust 
deeds in almost all cases.88 Apparently they still require copies 
of court orders wherever these are required by the state of fiduci-
ary administration.39 But the statute seems unlikely to get out-of-
state recognition from New York transfer agents, who refuse to 
rely on similar provisions in their version of the Uniform Fiduci-
aries Act.40 The Massachusetts act has not been repealed, and 
No -figures on volume of stock transfers by states are published, but one may compare 
numbers of associate members of the New York Stock Transfer Association, of whioh 
Wisconsin lists none, Minnesota 3 (in St. Paul and Minneapolis), and Michigan 9 (in 
Detroit, Dearborn, Grand Rapids and Muskegon). 
36 See note 48 infra. 
37 Mass. Gen. Acts, 1918, c. 68, §3; Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 203, §21. 
38 A vice-president of a Boston trust company writes (Jan. 10, 1958): 
"Over the years Transfer Agents have relied -more and more on this statute, and 
our practice in recent years has not required copies of trust instruments, wills, etc. from 
Trustees, Executors, Administrators, Guardians, etc., even if the transfers were made to 
the individual fiduciaries. • . • Incidentally, we apply the rules stated above on all 
fiduciaries appointed in any state if the transfer is effected here and the corporation is 
incorporated in the Commonwealth. 
"We also follow this procedure if the transfer is effected here and the corporation 
is incorporated in the states which have adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act ..•• " 
A similar report was received from another -bank. 
The frequent dispensing with certified copies of wills in Boston is confirmed ,by the 
summary of "transfer agents' requirements" in the Stock Transfer Guide, where this 
item is omitted from the requirement lists of First National of Boston, and Old Colony 
(of Boston). The requirement is still listed by Boston Safe Deposit, National Shawmut, 
New England Trust, and Second Bank-State. Since the letter quoted above came from 
one of the latter banks, simplification has evidently progressed farther than the Stock 
Transfer Guide discloses. 
39 All the Boston agents, including those who omit will copies from their Stock 
Transfer Guide lists, list "court order as required by state of probate," or words to the 
same effect. The distinction between will copies and court orders corresponds to a 
distinction in legal theory between a fiduciary's "·breach of trust" and "excess of powers." 
Since the Massachusetts statute of 1918 exonerates the security issuer only for "·breaohes 
of trust," Massaohusetts transfer agents have no charter •to dispense with proof of 
"power." See Christy, "Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock," 53 MrcH. L. REv. 701 
at 704-705 (1955); CHRISTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., §223 (1940). 
T,he Model Act expressly exonerates for excesses of power as well as for breaches 
of trust. See especially §3(a), which provides that the corporation "may assume without 
inquiry that the assignment • . • is within his authority and capacity, and is not in 
breach of his fiduciary duties .••• " 
40 The advantages of the Massachusetts act over the New York and Uniform 
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will continue to complement the Uniform Commercial Code, 
when the latter becomes effective on October 1, 1958. 
Although acts similar to Massachusetts' are in effect in Cali-
fornia, Connecticut, and Oklahoma, I have no evidence that they 
have had beneficial effects, and some evidence to the contrary.41 
On another front, some 40 states have attacked the transfer 
problem by passing "nominee acts," which authorize fiduciaries 
to put trust securities into the names of mere title holders instead 
of in the names of the fiduciaries as such. These acts, and their 
effects, are the subject of a separate study in this issue of the 
Review.42 Here, I will say only that the acts leave many categories 
of transfers wholly unsimplified, and that in the categories which 
are simplified, the acts substitute a lesser evil for a greater, rather 
than eliminating both. 
Why Prior Simplification Acts Have Failed 
Whether prior simplification acts substantially changed the 
law is not clear, but it is unimportant. What is important is 
that the acts failed substantially to change the practices of the 
major transfer agents.43 If we are concerned with the expense, 
the delay, and the annoyance of documenting transfers, trans-
fer officials are the ultimate tribunal for our purposes. 
Transfer officials' decisions result from a balancing of many 
considerations, and perhaps a little inertia and friction in the 
balancing mechanism. Against simplification stand these factors: 
(1) the risk of liability for improper transfers; (2) the expense of 
operating a transfer system which has different rules for transfers 
from different systems, and of frequently changing the systems as 
Fiduciaries' Acts seem to be limited to (1) the omission in Massachusetts of liability 
based on "knowledge of such facts that the action in registering the transfer amounts 
to bad .faith," and (2) the inclusion in Massachusetts of a provision that public record 
of a document does not constitute actual knowledge to the security issuer. On the whole, 
I am inclined to believe that the differences in attitudes of Boston and New York trust 
officers are more significant than the differences between the statutes with which they 
have to deal. The very similar law adopted by Connecticut in 1955 was described by its 
sponsors at some times as based on the Massachusetts act, and at other times as based 
on the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. 
41 See note 25 supra. 
42 See comment, p. 963 infra. 
43 I use the term "transfer agents" to designate the officials who make decisions about 
transfer policy, whether employed by security issuers or by the trust companies who 
act as professional transfer agents. Although trust companies may refer ,basic questions 
of policy to the issuing corporations, I am informed that they generally decide for 
themselves. 
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laws change; and (3) the embarrassment of being involved in an 
improper transfer, even if no legal responsibility attaches. 
In favor of simplification stand these factors: (1) the danger of 
liability for unreasonable refusal to transfer, or for delay; (2) the 
desire to escape the ill-will which frequently arises from docu-
mentary demands; (3) possible economies of operation under a 
simplified system; and (4) the danger of liability through notice 
acquired by demanding documents. 
Liability for Improper Transfers. The dominant factor in 
transfer officials' calculations is surely the fear of liability for 
improper transfers. Commentators on the earlier Uniform Acts 
(the Fiduciaries Act of 1921, and the Pennsylvania Commercial 
Code of 1952) apparently believed that they had reverted to the 
English rule, and thus eliminated the basis of transfer agents' 
fears. 44 Whether or not the rule adopted is the English rule, 45 
it leaves the security issuer exposed on a broad front. The Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act in the draft first presented to the conference 
expressly exposed the company to liability "where n~gistration 
of the transfer is made with actual knowledge that the fiduciary 
is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary." As if this 
were not threat enough, a last minute addition was added, "or 
with knowledge of such facts that the action in registering the 
transfer amounts to bad faith."46 
Security issuers are never- individuals; most of them are cor-
porations with thousands of employees, and their transfer agents 
are other corporations with hundreds of employees. The danger 
of vicarious knowledge, through some employee's possession of 
44 See notes 9 and 12 supra, and accompanying text; Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §325 (1956); 
Mudge v. Mitchell Hutchins Co., 322 Ill. App. 409, 54 N.E. (2d) 708 (1944); Stark v. 
National City Bank, 278 N.Y. 388, 16 N.E. (2d) 376 (1938). The latter case declares at 
p. 401: "In those jurisdictions of this country which have adopted the Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, the measure of responsibility, at least in cases which come within the 
provisions of that act, is restricted as in ·England." 
45 According to one view of the English law, the issuing company is not permitted 
to take notice of equitable interests, even if it wishes to. See In re Perkins, 24 Q.B. 613 
(1890); but compare Ireland v. Hart, [1902] 1 Ch. 522; GoRE-BROWN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT 
STOCK COMPANIES, 41st ed., 76 (1952); RANKING AND SPICER, COMPANY I.Aw, 10th ed., 
126 (1955). 
The secure feature in English law is the refusal to impute to a security issuer 
knowledge that is possessed even by its officers, if not actually known to the official who 
carries out the transfer. A tremendously significant case is Simpson v. -Molson's Bank, 
[1895] A.C. 270, in which knowledge of impropriety of a transfer was not charged to the 
bank, although one of the guilty executors was president of the bank, and his counsel 
as executor was also ·bank counsel. 
46 HANDBOOK, 340 (1922); 9-B U.L.A. 17 (1951). 
1958] FIDUCIARIES' STOCK TRANSFERS 853 
information about the transfer,47 is enough to make transfer agents 
demand documentation.48 
Pennsylvania's Commercial Code carries a similar threat. The 
exculpatory provisions are applicable only when the issuer has 
"no knowledge of the unrightfulness of the transfer," and no 
"notice of another claim to an interest in the security."49 
The Wisconsin simplification act attempts to mitigate the 
dangers of vicarious knowledge by confining it to knowledge held, 
or which should be held, by the very individual acting in the 
transfer.50 Although this may appear adequate to some readers, 
47 The worst examples of vicarious knowledge have arisen in cases involving notes or 
checks, which are well known ,to bank counsel. In Grace v. Corn Exchange Bank & 
Trust Co., 287 N.Y. 94, 38 N.E. (2d) 449 (1941), a ,bank was charged with notice of 
embezzlement from a trust account because of checks repeatedly drawn on it and deposited 
in the trustee's personal account. Although the court did not think a single deposit 
would charge the bank with notice, it thought the series should have put the bank on 
guard. "Each such transfer was notice that the depositor, heavily indebted to the bank, 
was acting in a manner that is 'unwise and hazardous.' A requirement that a clerk, 
receiving such notice, should report it would not unduly •hamper the transaction of the 
business of the bank.'' P. 106. 
For two other cases of vicarious knowledge of a bank in dealing with negotiable 
instruments, see O'Connor v. Cent. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 306 Ill. App. 414, 28 N.E. 
(2d) 755 (1940); Glendo State Bank v. Abbott, 30 Wyo. 98, 216 P. 700 (1923). 
48 KLINGLER, THE UNIFORM FIDUCIARIES Acr AS APPLIED TO CORPORATE SECURITY 
TRANSFERS IN NEW YORK STATE 57-58 (1956) (Rutgers Univ. Grad. School of Banking 
thesis). 
The Chicago SUGGESTED GUIDE FOR STOCK TRANSFER AGENTS UNDER ILLINOIS FIDUCIARIES 
SECURITIES TRANSFER Acr, August 26, 1957, states: "Other types of exoneration laws are 
in effect elsewhere (e.g., Ohio, Wisconsin) and the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted 
in Pennsylvania and as introduced in ,Massachusetts, contains exoneration provisions. 
Most of these laws are unsatisfactory because they do not make clear the extent to which 
the corporation and its agents will be charged with breach of trust as a result of actual 
or presumed knowledge by a corporation employee or through a will or other document 
of which the corporation has 'constructive knowledge.' Views of counsel should be obtained 
as to whether such an exoneration law may be relied upon in any state of principal 
contact.'' 
This document is signed by the Illinois State Bar Association Committee on 
Simplification of Security Transfers, and by the Stock Transfer Committee of the Chicago 
Corporate Fiduciaries Association. 
49 U.C.C. (1952) §§8-401, 8-403, 8-404. The 1952 version of the Uniform Commercial 
Code also contained other threats which resulted less from misguided policy decisions 
than from careless workmanship. For example, an issuer was protected only if a security 
were "fully indorsed" [§8-401 (1)], and indorsement was possible only by the registered 
owner [§8-308]; hence an executor or administrator could never "indorse" securities which 
stand in the decedent's name, and an issuer was never free from liability! 
For other defects in the Pennsylvania Commercial Code, see Trumbull, "The Proposed 
Uniform Commercial Code and Investment Securities in Illinois," 51 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 
424 at 442-445 (1956); notes, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 674 (1958); 103 UNIV. PA. L. REY. 209 (1954). 
For more sympathetic views of the Pennsylvania code, see Bunn, "Article 8-A Law for 
the Transfer of Investment Securities," 1952 WIS. L. R.Ev. 339; Dehner, "Article 8-
Investment Securities," 22 TENN. L. REv. 842 (1953); Walker, "Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 8-Investment Securities,'' 14 Omo ST. L. J. 57 (1953). 
50 Wis. Stat. Ann. (West, 1957) §180.85(4) and (5)(c). 
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it has in fact been deemed inadequate by Chicago transfer agents,51 
and they do not make simplified transfers of assignments which 
have significant Wisconsin contacts. 
If in estimating these threats, transfer officials seem to view 
fly specks through a magnifying glass, they are doing only what 
history has taught them to do. In 1857, the Wilmington and 
Raleigh Railroad on an executor's request transferred stock to 
Joseph and John Baker without examining the will or any court 
order. If its lawyers had read the leading cases of England, Vir-
ginia, and Massachusetts then extant,52 they would have done no 
differe!ltly-unless they had also read a circuit court opinion of 
Chief Justice Taney,53 and had weighted it more heavily than 
all the others. Sixty years later, Taney's view had become the law 
of the land, and the railroad was held liable to a remainderman.54 
The bequests to Joseph and John, it now appeared, were defeasi-
ble on death of the survivor without issue, which occurred in 1913. 
The same railroad made a similar mistake in 1869-still prior to 
the first appellate confirmation of Taney's doctrine-for which 
it paid the price in 1901.55 
Under these circumstances, a transfer agent cannot experiment 
for a year with a loose transfer policy, and determine next year 
what it cost; nor can it dismiss risks that have not yet matured 
into judicial holdings. 
Expense of a Differentiating Trans/ er System. If 51 states, 
territories and districts should adopt an identical and effective 
simplication law, it would surely be simpler to eliminate docu-
mentation than to retain it. But so long as a majority of the states 
require documentation, it may appear simpler to require docu-
mentation on all transfers than to try to classify them. 
My best evidence of this thinking is a letter from a Pittsburgh 
trust company official, whom I asked whether the company would 
be willing to dispense with documents other than the probate 
51 The writer has been furnished confidential copies of opinions of counsel to two 
large Chicago transfer agents, advising them against relying on it. 
52 Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jr. 55, 10 Eng. Rep. 891 (1796); Bank of 
Virginia v. Craig, 6 Leigh (33 Va.) 399 (1835); Hutchins v. State Bank, 12 Mete. (53 Mass.) 
421 (1847). 
53 Lowry v. Commercial Bank, (C.C. Md. 1848) 15 Fed. Cas. 1040. 
54 Baker v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 173 N.C. 365, 92 S.E. 170 (1917). The Atlantic 
Coast Line was a remote successor by merger to the Wilmington & Raleigh. 
55 Wooten v. Wilmington & Weldon R. Co., 128 N.C. 119, 38 S.E. 298 (1901). The 
Wilmington & Weldon was a successor -by merger to ilie Wilmington & Raleigh, to be 
later succeeded by the Atlantic Coast Line. 
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certificate in cases involving a Pennsylvania estate and a Pennsyl-
vania corporation, or an Ohio estate and Ohio corporation. He 
replied, 
"From the practical, operational standpoint, bearing in 
mind that the majority of transfers are handled by clerical 
personnel, we follow the general practice of asking for docu-
mentation. However, counsel advises that we may properly 
make transfers in the two situations which you mention on 
production of a probate certificate, and we are willing to do 
so on request."56 
In Philadelphia, I am informed that those transfer agents 
who simplify at all do so only in cases where all contacts are Penn-
sylvanian.57 They do not make simplified transfers in cases where 
all contacts are Ohioan. 
To be sure, transfer agents already distinguish to some extent 
between the laws of various states. They require proof that court 
orders have been entered if the fiduciary operates in a state whose 
law demands court orders, but not if he operates in a state which 
makes no such demand; they require inheritance tax waivers only 
from the states which have inheritance taxes.58 Hence one may 
doubt that the reason given by the Pittsburgh official is the only 
reason for his company's practice.59 Still, one can easily appreciate 
the complications involved in adjusting a transfer practice to the 
variations in transfer laws of the state of incorporation, the state 
of transfer, and the state of fiduciary administration, in addition 
to the variations of law which must already be taken into consid-
eration. The complications added might easily outweigh the 
56 The "two situations" referred to are (I) a transfer in Pennsylvania of a Penn-
sylvania fiduciary's stock in a Pennsylvania corporation, and (2) a transfer in Pennsylvania 
of an Ohio fiduciary's stock in an Ohio corporation. 
57 Conference of the author with '.E. Morris Bate, Jr., and other transfer officials of 
Girard Trust Company, Philadelphia, in May, 1955; letter of November I, 1957, from 
Eliot B. Thomas, of Philadelphia bar, .to author. 
58 See any number of lists of transfer requirements of various transfer agents in 
CCH STOCK GUIDE, p. 1101 ff., which include "If required by state of domicile or probate, 
a certified copy of order of court of competent jurisdiction directing sale or distribution," 
or words to this effect. T,his requirement is listed even by the Boston transfer agents who 
dispense with certified copies of wills. 
59 I have no doubt of the candor of the Pittsburgh explanation quoted in the text. 
However, even if counsel doubt the safety of making simplified transfers under Penn-
sylvania legislation, they might be wise to avoid announcing a policy of refusal. When 
sued for unreasonable refusal, their defense that they doubt the propriety of the particular 
transfer would be unconvincing in the presence of an announced policy of refusing all 
such transfers. This type of consideration probably impedes the obtaining of quotable 
statements on reasons for refusing to simplify security transfers. 
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.savings which result from eliminating documentation in the few 
instances where state law permits. 
Embarrassment. Do banks have non-economic scruples against 
adopting a system of transfers which might increase the number 
of wrongful transfers? In a recent article, the president of the 
New York Stock Transfer Association declared, 
"Often the advocates of simplified stock transfers point 
to the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and similar statutes and, in 
effect, say the transfer agent should put on a blind bridle 
and ride rough-shod over possible rights of widows and chil-
dren. No bank wants to be associated with a breach of trust, 
whether or not it can be held liable . .. .''60 
The prestige of a trust company could obviously be severely 
affected by its participation in a wrongful transfer of a large 
block of stock, in which some of its employees shared a degree of 
guilt. Although this type of factor is probably subordinate to 
considerations of legal liability, it is not necessarily negligible. 
Liability for Refusal To Transfer. Against a very real fear of 
liability for completing wrongful stock transfers, the transfer 
agent feels a rather faint apprehension of being punished for un-
reasonable den;iands for documents. However burdensome the 
documentary demands may be, it will be cheaper for the executor 
to comply than to start a lawsuit. · 
Moreover, the courts have been very sympathetic toward the 
corporation's refusal to transfer because of doubt of fiduciary 
authority. The parade of cases exempting the corporation from 
liability on this ground is almost as impressive as the parade of 
those imposing liability for making transfers wrongfully.61 
Furthermore, a transfer agent who likes to see documents can 
always start out by demanding them; most executors and adminis-
trators, although annoyed, will comply. If the fiduciary is inclined 
60 Williams, "Easing Problems of Stock Transfer," 73 BANKING L. J. 457 at 459 
(1956); 35 TRUST BUL. 34 (Feb. 1956); 95 TRUSTS & 'ESTATES 278 (1956). Emphasis supplied. 
61 In the following cases, the issuer was held not liable for refusal (temporary or 
perpetual) to transfer: Spangenberg v. Nesbitt, 22 Cal. App. 274, 134 P. 343 (1913); Bayard 
v. Farmers' &: !Mechanics' Bank of Philadelphia, 52 Pa. St. 232 (1866); Livezey v. Northern 
Pac. R., 157 Pa. St. 75, 27 A. 379 (1893); Hertz v. Record Pub. Co., (W.D. Pa. 1952) 105 
F. Supp. 200; Spellissy v. Cook &: Bernheimer Co., 58 App. Div. 283, 68 N.Y.S. 995 (1901); 
Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 263 App. Div. 261, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 556. 
Although there are plentiful cases of liability for refusal to transfer on demand of 
a registered owner in ihis own right [CHRISIY AND McLEAN, TRANFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 
§266 (1940)], I :have yet to discover a case imposing a monetary liability for demanding 
further proof of the authority of a fiduciary. 
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to sue, the transfer agent will usually have an opportunity to 
make the transfer after all. Thus a transfer agent can minimize 
both risks by initially demanding documents of everyone, but 
withdrawing the demand on those who stand on their rights.62 
The drafters of the Pennsylvania Commercial Code apparently 
intended to change transfer agents' practices by instilling in 
them a healthy fear of liability for refusal to transfer. While the 
exoneration provision is subordinate in position, and vague in 
extent, 63 the opening gun announces that the company must 
register the transfer, 64 and the main barrage forbids the company 
to demand documents beyond those on an approved list.65 It 
hardly matters that the two sections are inconsistent with each 
other;66 both threaten the company which withholds transfer. 
This approach testifies to a complete misunderstanding of 
the dynamics of share transfer. It leads quite logically to the sit-
uation which appears to prevail in Pittsburgh, where transfer 
agents initially demand full documentation, but will retreat if 
pressed.67 Simplification then exists only for those who know 
their rights precisely, and are prepared to do battle for them. 
The only judicial comment to date on the issuer's duty 
under the Pennsylvania Commercial Code indicates that judges 
are no more inclined to compel transfer under it than they were 
under prior law. 68 
62 Cf. quotation above, cited to note 56. 
63 The code [Pa Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A] does not define the situations 
in which the issuer is free of liability,. except by indicating that they are the same ones 
in which the issuer must register transfers [§8-401 (2)]. The duty to register is conditioned 
on lack of knowledge and of duty ,to inquire [§8-40l(l)(b)], and the duty to inquire is in 
turn conditioned on lack of notice [§8-403(1)]. In spite of the code's care in limiting 
"receipt" of notice [§1-201(27)], there is no such limitation on vicarious "notice" 
[see §1-201(25)], and "knowledge" is not defined at all. Consequently the door is wide open 
to imputation of knowledge and notice. 
64 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §8-401(1). 
65 Id., §8-402. 
66 Section 8-402(2) forbids the issuer to demand more evidence than certain listed 
documents, implying that these may be demanded. But §8-401(1) forbids requiring even 
these, since the duty to register exists if the certificate is "fully indorsed for transfer 
in conformity with the following section." The following section [8-402(1)] defines 
indorsement [by reference to "holder," §1-201(20)] in a way which clearly contemplates 
only signatures, not supporting evidence. This was one of the points made in proceedings 
of the New York Law Revision Commission's Committee on the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Art. 8. See minutes of ,May 19, 1955, items 60-61, and minutes of June 20, 1955, 
items 11-15; REPORT OF nm LAW REvlsION COMMISSION TO nm LEGISLATURE, LEGIS. Doc. 
No. 65(A), p. 43 (1956). 
67 See quotation in text above, cited to note 56. 
68 In Hertz v. Record Pub. Co., (W:D. Pa. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 200, the court referred 
to the Commercial Code as declaratory of existing law; the court dismissed a claim for 
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Economies of Operation. To transfer agents, a powerful ap-
peal of simplification laws is their offering of an opportunity to 
reduce demands on time and personnel. This is an incessant 
demand, as all kinds of costs make their annual growth, and the 
physical volume of transfers to be registered increases. Machine 
operations have long since been installed by the leading transfer 
agents to calculate, address, and mail dividend checks; if they 
had not been, it is hard to imagine how many floors of clerks, 
and what protracted record periods would be necessary. 
Chicago transfer agents have been pleasantly surprised at the 
increased ease of operation under the new statute. They had some 
reason to fear that the simplification statute would, in the first 
instances, effect more complication than simplification; it in-
creased the necessities for classifying transfers from different 
states, and handling them differently. One company reports that 
sorting has proved quite simple, and that 25 to 35 percent of all 
transfers are capable of being handled without the documents 
formerly demanded. There is no prospect of dramatic cost cutting, 
but an effective brake on inexorable cost increases has been dis-
covered. 
This experience will appeal to all far-sighted transfer agents, 
who must realize that rising costs threaten the entire operation.69 
Avoiding Ill-Will of Fiduciaries and Their Counsel. Anyone 
who knows trust companies knows that they are very sensitive 
about their public relations and are prepared to spend both time 
and money to win good will, and avoid ill. Their problem, in 
stock transfer work, is to weigh the ill-will occasioned by a ,;vrong-
ful transfer against the ill-will engendered by demands for doc-
uments. 
How the scale tips will vary with the extent to which protests 
against documentation are voiced and mobilized. I suspect that 
wrongful refusal of transfer, •hinting that it would do the same if the Commercial Code 
were applicable. 
69 Mr. Thomas H. Jolls, vice-president of the Northern Trust Company, Chicago., 
offers this observation: "I believe that there is an awakening consciousness that simplifica-
tion is a progressive and necessary step in the widening of the ownership of corporate 
securities. Just in my own experience in this field of about twenty years we have 
simplified stock subscription; we have simplified the ihandling of fractions on stock 
dividends; we have changed many other procedures which 20 years ago were accepted 
as a matter of course but are now regarded as too cumbersome. Currently we and other 
banks are studying new methods of record-keeping, simplification of forms of stock 
certificates, etc. • . • Continued growth of the number of stockholders in this country 
exerts a constantly increasing pressure on corporations and their Transfer Agents to find 
short cuts in getting the job done." -Memorandum to the author, dated Dec. 23, 1957. 
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the indignant voices of probate lawyers played their part in mak-
ing Illinois the first state in which all transfer agents simplified 
their practice immediately after the act became effective, and in 
which a broad representation of interested agents participated in 
the drafting of the act itself. The Chicago transfer agents had 
been given notice that the state bar association intended to draft 
appropriate legislation to simplify transfers.70 They could guess 
that if they did not participate in preparing legislation it would 
be prepared by someone else, and that if they did not conform to 
it they could expect a barrage of complaints from bar association 
leaders.71 
No such prompt preparations to simplify practices followed 
adoption of simplification acts in Delaware or Connecticut;72 this 
70 In October 1954, the American Telephone demanded a will copy, in addition 
to a court order, from an estate represented -by a prominent Grundy County lawyer, 
David F. Root. Root responded with a long and spirited letter to Telephone counsel 
(Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith), in which he stated among other things: "I respectfully 
request you to cite me one bit of Illinois law to support your position .••• The adoption 
of a policy such as you suggest is the •type of shortsighted stupidity which brings down 
the wrath of the layman upon the lawyers and large corporations. • • ." 
He sent a copy of his letter to the secretary of the state bar association, stating: "I 
respectfully request that this matter be considered by the Board of Governors as the 
policy sought to be recommended by Messrs. Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith is, as I 
have stated, not only stupid but is one which causes the expenditure of additional moneys 
to effect the transfer of stock and will reflect unfavorably on both members of the Bar 
and the corporations." 
Copies of these letters @loth dated October 14, 1954) were mimeographed and 
circulated among numerous lliinois bar association officers and transfer officials. On 
November 13, 1954, the Board of Governors of the lliinois State Bar Association passed 
a strongly worded resolution reciting the evils of documentary practice, and resolving, 
among other things, 
"That the Illinois State Bar Association condemns the existence and continuance 
of the evil of suoh stock transfer situation as imposing an inequitable and unnecessary 
burden .upon small Illinois estates. 
"The President ••• is directed to refer this Resolution to the executive committee 
of its section on Probate and Trust Law with direction to draft proposed legislation 
designed to remedy such evil in Illinois to the extent that the same is feasible and report 
the same to the Board as soon as possible •••• " 43 Iu.. B. J. 163 (1954). 
71Mr. Austin Fleming and Mr. Thomas H. Jolls of the Illinois committee ihave 
protested, on seeing this manuscript, against my emphasis on pressure from the .probate 
bar. I am deeply conscious of the helpful attitude which they took toward this problem 
from their first contacts with it, and of their contribution in selling a positive attitude 
to other transfer agents. I persist in believing that the demands of probate lawyers were 
influential, partly ibecause of the very passive attitude which I had previously met in the 
representatives of some trust companies and partly because of the absence of an energetic 
program for simplification in practice in states other than Illinois. 
72 A letter .from a trust department vice-president of Wilmington dated December 
3, 1957, states: 
"There are one or two large Delaware corporations who do their own transfer work. 
I have been in touch with one of them, and find they have not reached a firm conclusion 
as to practices which they are going to adopt under the new statute. 
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may be partly because trust companies there are not equally con-
fronted with an organized demand for simplification. 
The Danger of Demanding Documents. Before 1957, there 
was no danger ( except in Pennsylvania) in demanding docu-
ments; the issuer was charged with notice of the contents of docu-
ments which he did not see as well as of those which ·he did.78 
There is little danger under the Model Act, which provides that 
if the issuer requires a document to prove the status of a fiduciary, 
it is not charged with the rest of the document's contents.74 The 
sponsors of this act believe that if the danger of not demanding 
documents is removed, simplification will follow naturally. 
From the beginning, the framers of the Uniform Commercial 
Code have taken a much dimmer view of transfer agents' disposi-
tion to simplify. In the Pennsylvania version, they were at pains 
to forbid demands for documents, and to render transfer agents 
liable for making unnecessary demands.75 
The sponsors of the code have now abandoned the prohibition 
of documentation and have substituted a new deterrent. If the 
transfer agent does elect to demand documents, he is forever 
charged with notice of their contents.76 This ingenious provision 
mobilizes the fear that has motivated transfer agents to demand 
documents in the past; but its fire is now turned in the opposite 
direction. 
Naturally, this provision is not popular with transfer agents; it 
will earn their opposition in the legislatures. They think the 
threat is an undue penalty for a single error in demanding undue 
documentation; it obliges them to make some kind of notation 
so that once having demanded documentation they must ever 
after demand it; sometimes the demand for documentation is 
"In our bank, we are awaiting their plan of action, as we feel our procedure should 
be similar. • • ." 
My inquiries to Connecticut transfer agents regarding recent changes in their 
transfer practice have not yet been answered. 
However, the individual transfer agent of one of the large Delaware corporations 
informed the author under date of March 5, 1958, that it had dispensed with demands 
for will copies from Illinois, Connecticut, and Delaware fiduciaries since October 1957. 
73 Lowry v. Commercial Bank, (C.C. Md. 1848) 15 Fed. Cas. 1040; Baker v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 173 N.C. 365, 92 S.E. 170 (1917). 
74 Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act, §3(c). The text of the act is reproduced 
at p. 885 infra. 
75 Pennsylvania Commercial Code, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A, §§8•401(1), 
8-402(2). 
76 Massachusetts Commercial Code, Mass. Acts 1957, c. 765, §8-402(4). 
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unavoidable;77 the danger may prove to be so great that they 
will go back to their old documentary ways. 
Since the provision has obvious demerits, the question is 
whether transfer agents need this kind of an impulsion to induce 
them to simplify. The Commissioners of Uniform Laws, who 
have never been convinced that the Uniform Fiduciaries Act 
did not deserve success, naturally regard the transfer agents as 
a stubborn lot who must be coerced. Naturally, the transfer 
agents do not think of themselves that way. 
Fortunately, the question can probably be answered by obser-
vation, before 1958 has run its course. Already, it is a matter of 
record that Illinois transfer agents have simplified their proced-
ures, without the threat contained in the Uniform Commercial 
Code. If Delaware and Connecticut transfer agents follow suit, 
there will be no argument for continuing the notice provision 
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Will the 1957 Simplification Acts Succeed? 
Of the four states which passed simplification acts in 1957, 
two passed the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act78 in 
complete form (Delaware and Illinois),79 one passed it with 
changes (Connecticut),80 and one passed a revised Uniform Com-
mercial Code containing simplification provisions (Massachu-
77 The principal situation cited here is where a trustee dies or retires, and another 
is appointed in ,his place by a procedure specified in the trust instrument. Since the 
issuer must have proof (even under the simplification acts) that the trustee rightfully 
holds his office, it must see the trust instrument. Under the Massachusetts code, it will 
then be charged with knowledge of all the provisions of the trust. 
78 Since the text of the act, released by the American Bar Association Committee on 
Simplification of Security Transfers in January 1957, is not yet widely available, it is 
reproduced at p. 885 infra. It was first published in Jolls, "Security Transfer Simplifica-
tion," 96 TRUSfS & EsTATES 641 (1957). 
The Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act was developed as a result of continuing 
activity of the Committee on Simplification of Security Transfer by Fiduciaries, formed in 
1951 within the Section of Real Estate, Probate, and Trust Law of the American Bar 
Association, and of the Committee on Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers of the 
Illinois State Bar Association. The author of the draft which won final adoption (with 
minor changes) was Francis T. Christy of New York, a member of the A.B.A. committee. 
The final draft of the act was issued by the committees in January 1957, simultaneously 
with its introduction in the Illinois legislature. Members of the A.B.A. committee at this 
time were Willard R. Brown (Miami), Charles Bunn (Madison), Donald J. Burdine (Los 
Angeles), Francis T. Christy (New York), Alfred F. Conard, Chairman (Ann Arbor), 
Joseph P. Cummings (New Rochelle), Robert B. Fizzell (Kansas City, Mo.), Austin 
Fleming (Chicago), Coll Gillies (Chicago), Rollin B. Mansfield (Chicago), Creighton S. 
Miller, former chairman (Chicago), Berto Rogers (New York), John J. Schatt (Harrisburg), 
Alphonse Santangelo (Norristown, Pa.), and Millard Vandervoort (Battle Creek). 
79 Del. Laws 1957, S.B. 287; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 32, §§439.50 to 439.57. 
80 Conn. Pub. Acts 1957, No. 573. 
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setts).81 Whether these laws "succeed" will not depend on whether 
they please judges or law professors, but whether they please 
the transfer agents. I will discuss them in that light. 
The Model Act. In Illinois, the Model Act has already suc-
ceeded. Every one of the professional transfer agents in Chicago 
is now making stock transfers for fiduciaries (within appropriate 
territorial limits) without the traditional documents, according 
to information given me.82 To judge whether this situation is 
likely to continue, and whether it will prevail in other states, 
calls for some analysis of the factors contributing to the Illinois 
situation. 
Some of the factors are local. One of these is the indefatigable 
labors of Austin Fleming, chairman of the interested State Bar 
Association committee. His initiative and energy are the explana-
tion for the remarkable fact that in the few weeks between the 
date of the governor's signature and the effective date of the act, 
the transfer agents had united on their new procedures and put 
them in effect immediately after Labor Day, 1957. Another local 
factor is the representative character of the committee which de-
veloped the act, including outstanding probate lawyers and law-
yers associated with leading transfer agents of Chicago.83 A third 
local factor is the militant sentiment in the Illinois bar, 84 and the 
support of bar association leaders.85 
81 Mass. Acts&: Resolves 1957, c. 765. 
82 Oral and written communications from Austin Fleming, a staff attorney of the 
Northern Trust Company (Chicago), and chairman of the Illinois State Bar Association 
Committee on Simplification of Security Transfers by Fiduciaries. 
83 Of the nine Chicago trust companies listed as associate members of the New York 
Stock Transfer Association (First, Continental, Northern, Harris, City, American, Chicago 
National, LaSalle, Chicago Title) the fust three named :had employees or officers who 
were members of the Illinois Bar Association committee. Relative volumes of stock 
transfer business are not published, but the order in which all are named above is the 
order of their total assets at the close of 1956, according to Moody's Financial Manual. 
Other members of the committee were associated as counsel for major corporations 
which maintain their own transfer facilities in Chicago, including American Telephone 
and Commonwealth Edison. 
The members of the committee were Merrit C. Bragdon, James E. Doherty, Austin 
Fleming, William M. James, Thomas H. Jolls, Creighton S. Miller, Henry L. Pitts, 
Edmond B. Stofft, James A. Velde, and Robert B. Wilcox. 
Although several members of the committee have asked not to be identified as 
representatives of the companies named, I regard their affiliations as significant in the 
drafting of the Model Act and in its subsequent acceptance. By way of contrast, I am 
told that the Commercial Code was adopted in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania without any 
prior consultation with any of the local attorneys familiar with the routine of stock 
transfers. 
84 See note 70 supra. 
85 The ,Model Act moved so smoothly through Illinois that it was never necessary 
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But other factors, which are not local, appear to have pre-
dominated even on the Illinois scene. Most important of these 
is the technical merit of the Model Act. It repudiates flatly the 
Taney-born theory that a corporation is a trustee for the owners 
of beneficial interest in its shares. 86 It substitutes what may be 
called a "curtain" scheme;87 equitable interests in shares are be-
hind the "curtain" of registered ownership, hidden from the 
corporation's eyes. The curtain can be opened only by a written 
notice of adverse claim, delivered to the corporation before the 
transfer is made. This is essentially the system which prevails in 
England, 88 and gives great satisfaction there, although the tech-
_nical bases of it are quite different.89 The act is brief, and raises 
no ghosts of other dreaded liabilities. 
Another non-local factor is the authorship of the act. Francis 
Christy, the principal draftsman, is the author of the treatise 
which is on every transfer officer's desk. 90 The dubious trans-
to call on visible support from high brass. However, it was probably helpful that Thomas 
S. Edmonds, who had promoted formation of the American Bar Association's committee 
on simplification in 1951, and the Illinois State Bar Association's committee in 1954, was 
president of the Illinois association in 1955-56. The 1956-57 president, J. Gladwyn Thomas, 
was also in full sympathy. 
86 See §§2 and 3, p. 885 infra. For the Taney-born theory, see Lowry v. Commercial 
Bank, (C.C. Md. 1848) 15 Fed. Cas. 1040, and comments on it by Christy, "Responsibilities 
in the Transfer of Stock," 53 MICH. L. REv. 701 (1955), and by Conard, "Simplifying 
Stock Transfers," 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1 (1957). 
87 "Curtain" is the name applied to the system of relieving purchasers of responsibility 
for equities and future interests in titles to real property, introduced by various English 
Real Property Law reform acts, which place "naked equitable interests decently behind 
legal curtains." The English pattern of stock transfer was cited as a model of freedom 
from equities, although the name "curtain" does not seem to have been used in connection 
with stock transfers. For references to the "curtain" idea, and to the modeling of reformed 
real property transfers on English stock transfers, see the following: FOURTH REPORT OF 
ACQUISmoN AND VALUATION OF LAND COMllffITEE ON TRANSFER OF LAND IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES 11, 43 (1919) ("curtain provisions"), 33 (analogy to stock transfer); WoLSrENHOLME 
AND CHERRY, CONVEYANCING STATUTES, 12th ed., clxxvi, 209 (1930) (analogy to stock 
transfer); UNDERHILL, A CONCISE EXPLANATION OF LORD BIRKENHEAD'S ACT 78, 91 (1922) 
(curtain clauses, with literary credit to Shakespeare); MEGARRY, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 2d 
ed., 572 (1955) (analogy to share transfer). 
88 GORE-BROWN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES, 41st ed., 252-253 (1952). The 
English practice requires the adverse claimant to serve a "notice in lieu of distringas," 
followed by a court order within eight days. A "distringas" is a preliminary seizure writ, 
comparable to an attachment. 
89 Instead of a law to rebut any implication of notice, the English have a law forbid-
ding the registration of title in any way except absolute ownership, so that no notice of 
trusts can very well arise. GORE-BROWN, HANDBOOK ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES, 41st ed., 
253-254 (1952); GOWER, MODERN COMPANY LAW 389 (1954). 
90 CHRISTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANFER OF STOCK, 2d ed. (1940). This book has been 
called the "transfer agent's Bible." Mudge, "The Simplification of Corporate Fiduciary 
Transfers," 35 TRusr BUL. 20 (Feb. 1956). 
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fer officer, wondering whether to pass a simplified transfer, re-
ceives reassurance from the adviser who normally confirms his 
doubts. 
Although transfer agents in other states cannot have the sense 
of proprietorship which Illinois transfer agents feel in the Model 
Act, they will have the advantage of a successful experiment to 
observe. I have yet to discover a transfer agent who is anything 
but pleased with the Model Act; the approbation of this group 
seems assured. 91 
Hence, it seems likely that most transfer agents in Delaware 
and Connecticut will do as Illinois transfer agents have done, 
although they have not done it as quickly. Human nature (in-
cluding that of bankers and lawyers) being what it is, there will 
probably be some abundantly cautious agents who will insist on 
the old documentation until legal or moral pressure is put on 
them. Bar associations-state and national-will have a role to 
play in obtaining 100 percent conformity.92 
In Connecticut, the problem is slightly complicated by a 
deletion which the legislature made in the official form of the 
Model Act. It deleted section 5, which declares that "a corpora-
tion making a transfer under this Act incurs no liability to any 
person." At first glance, the deletion suggests that corporations 
are to be liable as heretofore. Further examination shows that 
the remaining sections negative liability, and the no-liability 
clause was presumably deemed surplusage. Passage of the act 
would have been futile if the legislature intended liability to 
continue unaffected. I have been orally informed that the com-
mittee in charge struck the no-liability clause as surplusage, but 
that there is no written evidence of legislative purpose. Chicago 
91 This observation is based on personal meetings with several officers of Chicago 
and New York transfer agents, and of the New York Stock Transfer Association. Their 
attitude toward the Model Act contrasts with their attitude toward the Uniform 
Commercial Code, to which they have frequently expressed their private opposition. 
Although the agents and the association have never put themselves on record as opposed 
to the code, prominent persons associated with the transfer agents testified against the 
code in the New York Law Revision Commission hearings. See 2 N.Y. LAW REv. COMM. 
REP. 905 (1954) (Gaines & Hutson, attorneys for American Telephone), 929 (Haberkern, 
Ohase National), 953 (Bancroft, Bank of New York). 
92 A most important feature of the Illinois experience was the sponsoring committee's 
organization of meetings to explain to transfer agents and to probate lawyers what could 
be accomplished, and what could not, under the new act. Similar meetings were held 
in Philadelphia in 1953 following adoption of the Commercial Code, and may account 
in part for the difference between the code's relative success in the two ends of the state. 
There were no such meetings, I am told, in Pittsburgh. 
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transfer agents' counsel seem to have decided that the Connecticut 
act, despite its deletions, has the same effect as the Illinois act.93 
Will transfer agents in the other simplification states-Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin-accept the Model 
Act as reliable, so far as it applies to transfers in those states? No 
opinion adverse to its effectiveness has yet been heard. Yet its 
prospects in those states are not good. Simplification is spotty, 
at best, in Ohio and Pennsylvania.94 Probably most of the transfer 
work in Wisconsin is local, so that there will be little occasion 
to, set up procedures applicable to transfers having Illinois or 
Delaware contacts. In all three states, the transfer agents will be 
conscious that their Illinois colleagues refuse to rely on these 
states' simplification acts, and negative reciprocity is likely to 
point to non-recognition of the Model Act. 
For recognition of the Model Act in Massachusetts, there is 
more hope. Some Massachusetts agents for Massachusetts com-
panies already dispense with certified copies of wills.95 The ques-
tions are (I) will these agents now dispense with certified copies 
when acting for Connecticut, Delaware, and Illinois companies, 
and (2) will they dispense with court orders from Illinois fidu-
ciaries (Delaware and Connecticut laws do not require court 
orders). Since Boston transfer agents appear to have been among 
the nation's most progressive prior to the 1957 legislation, they 
seem likely to give the Model Act at least as much effect as the 
cautious Chicago transfer agents have given it. If so, both the 
above questions would be answered in the affirmative. 
The principal cloud is reciprocity. It now seems doubtful 
that Chicago transfer agents will recognize Massachusetts legisla-
tion as "safe,"96 and Boston bankers may be tempted to retaliate. 
This probability emphasizes the importance of efforts now going 
on to simplify the simplification movement.97 
Massachusetts' Revised Commercial Code. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as revised and adopted in Massachusetts in 1957, 
93 SUGGESTED GUIDE FOR STOCK TRANSFER AGENTS, UNDER lLLINOIS FIDUCIARIES SECURITIES 
TRANSFER Acr, August 26, 1957. 
94 See notes 30, 32 and 33 supra and accompanying text. 
95 See note 38 supra and accompanying text. 
96 The Chicago SUGGESTED GUIDE FOR TRANSFER AGENTS (note 93 above), expressly 
declares the ,Massachusetts Commercial Code inadequate. Reasons are discussed in the 
next section of this article. 
97 See note 163 infra and accompanying text. 
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does not become effective until October 1, 1958.98 Continuing in 
effect with it will be the act of 1918, relieving security issuers of 
liability for breach of trust.99 
As to wholly intra-state transfers, we can expect complete 
simplification. In fact, we already have it at some transfer offices,100 
and I write "some" only because I have been unable to get de-
tailed statements from all sources. Although the act of 1918 does 
not contain any provisions to dispense with court orders, this is 
irrelevant to intrastate transfers because Massachusetts executors 
and administrators can sell or distribute without court orders.101 
The hard question is how far transfer agents in other states 
will go in simplifying transfers for Massachusetts corporations, or 
Massachusetts fiduciaries. We may well start our inquiry with 
Pennsylvania, which also has a lawbook labelled "Uniform Com-
mercial Code."102 
In Pennsylvania, we start with the fact that Pittsburgh agents 
have generally not simplified at all.103 They are not likely to 
start relying on Massachusetts' act until they first rely on their 
own. 
In Philadelphia, intrastate transfers have been simplified. But 
there has been no simplification involving Massachusetts corpora-
tions or fiduciaries, or Ohio corporations or fiduciaries, even 
though some agents in both of those states have simplified intra-
state transactions. The prior Massachusetts act and the Ohio acts 
seem to be at least as well drawn as the Pennsylvania act.104 I con-
clude that Pennsylvania agents have simplified where they thought 
they could be forced to (under the mandatory clause of the Com-
mercial Code) and in no other instance.105 It seems a safe bet 
that the Pennsylvania courts will not force their agents to rely 
on foreign law, at least where the effectiveness of that law is de-
98 Mass. Acts & Resolves 1957, c. 765. 
99 Note 37 supra. 
100 Note 38 supra. 
101 CCH STOCK TRANSFER GUIDE, p. 25,003. 
102 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1954) tit. 12A. 
103 Note 33 supra. 
104 The Massachusetts law exposes the transfer agent to liability "for participating 
with actual knowledge of a breach of trust." The Ohio law exposes the transfer agent 
"for participating in bad faith with a fiduciary in a breach of any duty of the latter." 
The Pennsylvania code exposes the transfer agent who acts "with notice of another claim." 
See note 49 supra. 
105 As previously noted, the Pennsylvania code expressly forbids the transfer agent 
to demand more than certain minimum documents, and threatens him with liability if 
he refuses to transfer on the terms outlined in the code. §§8-401, 8-402. 
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nied elsewhere. So long as Chicago agents deny the effectiveness 
of Massachusetts law, 100 Pennsylvania agents will probably do 
likewise. 
If, however, Pennsylvania's Uniform Commercial Code should 
be made uniform with that of Massachusetts, the picture would 
change in two ways. Pennsylvania agents could no longer argue 
to Pennsylvania courts that it is too much for them to determine 
the effect of Massachusetts law. Second, and more important, the 
Pennsylvania transfer agents might have such increased confidence 
in their own law that they would willingly give it maximum, rath-
er than minimum, effect. 
In Illinois, where the transfer agents have already evidenced 
intention to give their act a maximum effect, the preconditions 
are more favorable to giving recognition to the new Massachus-
etts legislation. However, Illinois agents have apparently decided 
not to give effect to prior legislation of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin, or to the Massachusetts Commercial Code, chiefly 
because of the exceptions for "actual knowledge" or "notice.''107 
The Massachusetts Commercial Code narrows the exception, 
but does not limit it to written adverse claims, as in the Model 
Act. The new Massachusetts exception will operate (I) when the 
issuer has "received notification" in time to act on it (including 
oral notification), and (2) when the issuer has demanded doc-
umentary evidence, and the documents contain information ad-
verse to the transfer .108 
Consequently, Illinois transfer agents apparently will not 
accept the Massachusetts Commercial Code as furnishing suf-
ficient protection. The risks under the Commercial Code are 
obviously wider than under the Model Act. How much more 
liability is involved per million transfers, the Illinois agents do 
not purport to know. They conceive of themselves as risk avoid-
ers, not risk distributors. If the risk can be reduced by practic-
able measures, they intend to reduce it, not take it. 
The prospects of the Commercial Code cannot be candidly re-
viewed ·without acknowledging also the existence of a spirit of gen-
eral distrust toward the code. When it was put forth in an official 
draft in 1952, bankers and lawyers characteristically doubted 
that anything so comprehensive needed to be done at all, or 
106 See note 48 supra. 
107Ibid. 
108 Mass. Comm. Code §8-403(1). 
868 MICHIGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 56 
that it could be done well even if needed.108a When they took 
the trouble to study the code and suggest changes, they were 
told that the code was final, and needed no improvement. Sub-
sequent revisions have confirmed the doubters' attitudes, rather 
than reassuring them. When they are asked to re-examine the 
work, they are inclined to say, "Must we spend another four 
years proving to you that it can't be done?" 
Another source of hostility is a by-product of the bigness of 
the code. There is some provision in it to offend everyone, so 
nearly everyone is opposed to its enactment until his change is 
made. There are some provisions which are quite offensive to 
transfer agents.109 Opposition to adoption of the code in one's 
l0SaSee remarks of Samuel L. Rosenberry, 2 N.Y. LAw R.Ev. COMM. REP. 144, 188 
(1954). 
109 Many transfer agents object to the code's affirmative statement of the issuer's 
duties to transfer on proper demand [§8-401(1)], to pay damages for wrongful refusal 
[§8-401(2)], and to replace a security which has been wrongfully transferred [§8-402(2)]. 
Although liabilities of this sort exist under current law, the issuer's opportunities to 
defend on the ground of "reasonable" doubt or delay are probably constricted by the 
precision of the code. 
The transfer officials have a much more legitimate objection, in my opinion, to an 
innovation in the Massachusetts code which deprives them of recourse against a person 
who has innocently presented a certificate with a forged indorsement, and received in 
return a new certificate. Prior decisions concurred that the presenter of a security warrants 
the genuineness of indorsements, and is liable to the issuer when the latter discovers his 
error: Boston & Albany R. Co. v. Richardson, 135 Mass. 473 (1883); Hambleton & Co. v. 
Central Ohio R.. Co., 44 Md. 551 (1876); Lake Superior Corp. v. Rebre, 65 Pa. Super. 
379 (1917). 
Although the issuer ordinarily has no way of verifying indorsers' signatures, the 
code deprives it of any right to reclaim the new certificate, and leaves it to depend 
entirely on the signature guaranty (if any). Since this guaranty has frequently been made 
gratuitously ·by a country banker a thousand miles away, it is a vastly less satisfactory 
remedy than to go against the presenter (who may still be a shareholder), or against the 
broker who handled the transaction. 
I have heard suggestions that the issuer might protect itself by requiring the 
presenter of a certificate to guarantee prior indorsements, but any such demand is 
apparently forbidden by §8-401(1). 
The unwelcome abolition of the common law presenter's warranties has a curious 
history. The 1952 code was silent on the subject, but it introduced the novel proposition 
that the bona fide purchaser of a certificate with forged indorsement washes away his 
liability to the owner by exchanging the forged certificate for a new one in the purchaser's 
own name (§8-311). Someone must have noticed the disharmony between this proposition 
and the common law; instead of abandoning the innovation, someone added a sentence 
to Comment 2 stating that such a bona .fide purchaser is not liable to the issuer (1953 
Code, §8-311, Comment 2, last sentence). 
The New York Law Revision Commission's committee pointed out that this was 
legislation by comment [Analysis of §§8-311(b) through 8-319, prepared for Professor 
Fricke .by Edward Greenbaum, Nov. 2, 1954, p. 6]. 
The committee also received arguments from counsel for American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company that the presenter's warranties should be expressly preserved 
(Report of Meeting of Committee on U.C.C. Articles, Dec. 6-7, 1954, items 99, 117-119). 
The U.C.C. Editorial Board responded by adding a new section, §8-407, which 
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own state is easily translated into opposition to recognition of 
the code's effectiveness in another state. 
Having looked carefully at reactions to the Massachusetts 
Code on the part of transfer agents in Pennsylvania and Illinois, 
we have little to add about the other states. Ohio agents will 
have the same general set of motivations as Pennsylvanian's. Con-
necticut and Delaware agents are likely to go no farther th'an 
Illinois agents go. Wisconsin agents' business is probably so local 
that there will be little occasion to formulate policies applicable 
to interstate transfers. 
Conflicts and Contacts 
For the interstate corporation, the simplification of stock 
transfers may depend on the laws of many states. A corporation 
which has made a mistaken transfer may be sued in any of the 
states and territories in which it does business. It may even be 
sued in foreign countries. Should it defer the simplification of 
its stock transfers until all these states and countries have adopted 
simplification acts? 
Fortunately, no one seems to think so. Among people who 
worry about the law governing stock transfers, only three con-
tacts of any fiduciary transfer are receiving serious considera-
tion.110 These are the state of incorporation, the state of registra-
tion of transfer, and the state of fiduciary administration. 
State of Incorporation. The only one of these contacts which 
has any substantial support in American case law and legal theory 
is the state of incorporation. The only cases known to me which 
expressly stated the common-law presenter's warranties (Supplement No. 1 to 195!1 
Commercial Code, 1955). 
The Law Revision Commission's Committee rejected this patch, chiefly on the ground 
of disharmony with §8-311 (Report of Meeting of Committee on U.C.C. Article 8, May 
19, 1955, items 12-16). The Editorial Board surrendered, and added a clause to section 
8-306(1), expressly excluding liability of an innocent presenter [U.C.C. of 1957, §8-306(1)]. 
So far as I can determine, no one ever examined carefully the merits of the innovation 
in §8-311 which started all the trouble. 
110 Based on oral conversations with groups of transfer attorneys of Chicago and 
New York, and on the SUGGESTED GUIDE FOR STOCK TRANSFER AGENTS UNDER lu.INOIS 
FIDUCIARIES SECUIUTIES TRANSFER Acr, August 26, 1957. 
One other contact-the state in which the certificate was delivered for sale-is 
considered by Christy and McLean, but rejected after examination. [TRANSFER OF STOCK, 
2d ed., §232 (1940)]. Another-the "Commercial domicil"-is suggested ,by Rabel, in 2 
CONFLICT OF LAws-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 42-45 (1947); this will be considered at a later 
point. 
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give serious consideration to the question so hold.111 The Restate-
ment of Conflicts is flatly in accord.112 
This well established doctrine probably grew out of the theory 
that a corporation is an artificial creation of the state in which 
it was formed, and necessarily lives, moves and has its legal being 
in the atmosphere of that state.113 The doctrine may be supported 
today on the more practical ground that the rights of the various 
far-flung shareholders should be equal, and they can be equal 
only if their rights are determined under the same system of law. 
It would be extremely confusing to everyone if the rights of the 
shareholders were to change like the climate as the corporation's 
activities migrate from state to state. The only satisfactory choice 
of a state whose law is to be applied is the state of incorporation.114 
State of Transfer on Books of Corporation. Although no cor-
poration has yet been held liable to its shareholders in defiance 
of the law of the state of incorporation, transfer officials do not 
confine their attention to past holdings. They worry about future 
ol'1:es. They may well do so, for the history of stock transfer law 
contains clear cases of liability for conduct which conformed to 
apparent legal standards when it was done.m 
Granting that the law may break from its present mooring at 
the state of incorporation, what are the chances of its drifting to 
the state where the stock is transferred on the books, that is, where 
the old certificate is exchanged for a new one? An unsophisticated 
view of the situation leads directly this way because improper 
registration of transfer wrongs the former owner, and ·wrongs are 
111 Hiller v. American Tel&: Tel. Co., ~24 Ma~. 24, 84 N.E. (2d) 548 (1949); Seymour 
v. Nat. Biscuit Co., (3d Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 58. See also, more generally, Disconto-
Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp.; 267 U.S. 22 (1925). 
112 CoNFLicr OF LAws REsrATEMENT. §§53, 182 (1934). See also Wilcox, "The New 
Illinois Fiduciary Transfer Simplification Act," 45 ILL. B. J. 740 (1957); Pirtle, "The New 
Ohio Securities Transfer Statute and Conflict of Laws," 22 Omo OP. 539 (1942). Cf. 
Coleman, "Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws," 63 HARv. L. REv. 433 (1950); 
Baker, "Conflict of Laws in the Administration of Intangibles," 19 Mo. L. R.Ev. 1 (1954). 
113 Marshall, C.J., in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 
518 at 636 (1819). Cf. Canada Southern R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883). 
114 Justice Holmes, ruling that Nebraska must apply to a fraternal insurance policy 
the law of the state of incorporation, said: "The act of becoming a member is something 
more than a contract, it is entering into a complex and abiding relation, and as marriage 
looks .to domicil, membership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State 
granting the incorporation. We need not consider what other States may refuse to do, 
but we deem it established that they cannot attach to membership rights against the 
Company that are refused by the law of domicil. It does not matter that the member 
joined in another State." Modem Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 at 551 (1925). 
115 See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text. 
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governed by the law of the place where they are committed.m 
To escape from this easy conclusion, one must point out that the 
shareholder's rights arise only from the corporation's charter, 
and this is subject to the law of the state of incorporation.117 
There is always the possibility that the judge will take the unso-
phisticated view and decline to follow the more sophisticated way 
out. 
At least two lines of doctrine exist which may incline a judge 
to apply law of the state of transfer on the books, even though he 
fully grasps the state-of-incorporation theory. One is the view 
that states in which corporate activities are carried on have an 
interest which makes their legislation prevail over that of the state 
of transfer.118 For instance, the state in which dividends are de-
clared and distributed may punish the directors according to its 
own law;119 or a state in which an allegedly assessable member of 
a foreign corporation resides may apply its own law to decide 
whether he became a member.120 
Another line of doctrine is that shareholders' rights are so 
far "embodied in the certificate" that they become subject to 
the law of the place where the certificate is. This idea was enun-
ciated in the famous dictum of Holmes, "the question who is the 
owner of the paper depends on the place where the paper is."121 
And so he held that the English government's seizure of a certifi-
cate for a share in a New Jersey corporation divested the rights 
of the shareholder, even though there was not a word of New 
Jersey law which recognized transfer in this manner. On the same 
theory, a Maine court ruled ineffective a transfer of stock which 
violated Maine law, although it might have been good by the 
laws of the states whose corporations issued the shares.122 
Both these lines of doctrine, and their accompanying cases, 
116 CONFLICT OF LAWS REsrATEMENT §§377-378 (1934). 
117 See authorities cited in notes 111-114 supra. 
118 Compare the language of Circuit Judge Holmes in Wirt Franklin Petroleum 
Corp. v. Gruen, (5th Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 659 at 660, where he said, "Indeed, where a 
domicile in fact is shown to exist, corporate convenience is subserved .by litigation where 
the corporation actually is, rather than where its fictitious citizenship exists. . . • The 
trend of modern decisions is to administer justice in accordance with the realities disclosed 
by the facts; no legal fiction, however revered in antiquity, should be given effect when 
it is clearly antagonistic to the facts, to common sense, and to natural justice." The 
issue before the court concerned jurisdiction of courts, not choice of governing law. 
119 German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915). 
120 Pink v. AAA Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941). 
121 Disconto-Gesellschaft v. U.S. Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 at 28 (1925). 
122 Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A. (2d) 241 (1949). 
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can be distinguished easily enough.123 But a doctrine which can be 
limited can also be extended. The transfer agents' insistence on 
a simplification law at the place of registration of transfer is 
based, I suppose, on fear that the doctrines will be extended.124 
State of Fiduciary Administration. Least of all support exists 
for applying to a corporation's stock transfers the law of the state 
in which the executor or administrator entitled to the stock was 
appointed. No general principle points in this direction, and 
there are neither holdings nor dicta to this effect.125 
Still, many transfer agents demand statutory protection from 
the state of fiduciary administration. Before we condemn them let 
us imagine the strongest kind of case for applying that law. 
A judge appoints an executor. The executor makes wrongful 
transfers, and defaults; his surety is insolvent. A substituted ad-
123 Aside from other distinctions, the Diehl and Pink cases deal with a corporate 
member's liability under the law of the state in whioh the member acted. Neither, there-
fore, can possibly constitute a holding upon the liability of the corporation. Both cases 
are the subjects of extensive commentary. On the German-American case, see Coleman, 
"Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws," 63 HAR.v. L. REv. 433 (1950); on the 
Pink case, see note, 42 CoL. L. REv. 689 (1942). 
The Disconto and Strout cases both rest on the view that the corporation has by its 
own domestic law "embodied the share in the certificate." This reasoning would not 
apply under the Model Act, which expressly reserves to the state of incorporation 
governance of the shareholder's rights against the corporation. Model Fiduciaries Securities 
Transfer Act, §6, p. 885 infra. 
Section 8-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1957), which was not present in 
former editions, provides: "The validity of a security and the rights and duties of the 
issuer with respect to registration of transfer are governed by the law (including the 
conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction of organization of the issuer." 
124 An editorial note in 48 YALE L. J. 92 (1938) argues that the law of the place 
of transfer registration should be ·applied, apparently because most transfers take place 
in New York, and New York has (the editor avers) an effective exoneration act. This 
Yalish argument apparently loses any force which it had when we discover that the 
New York exoneration act is not effective. The editor did not seem to contend that 
there was any case support for his argument. 
Henry Pirtle, the Ohio simplifier, contended that the issuer could be exonerated 
either by the law of the place of incorporation, or by the law of the place of registration 
of transfer, regardless of the law of the other place. Citing cases, he reasoned that courts 
will not hold anyone liable for acts which were lawful where they were performed; 
and that even acts which are unlawful where performed can be excused by a release 
given elsewhere. See Pirtle, "The New Ohio Securities Transfer Statute and Conflict 
of Laws," 22 OHIO OP. 539 (1942). 
125 Christy [TRANSFER OF STOCK, 2d ed., 120 (1940)) reports with obvious reserve: 
"It ihas been held that the power of a fiduciary to transfer stock is governed by the laws 
of the jurisdiction where he is appointed, and not by the laws of the jurisdiction in which 
the corporation is domiciled"; but the decision cited enunciates the more modest 
proposition that if the transfer of stock is valid ,by the law of fiduciary administration, 
it will be recognized by the state of incorporation. Ross v. Southwestern R. Co., 53 Ga. 
514 at 532 (1874). This statement by no means implies that other states will regard as 
void all transfers which are void by the law of fiduciary administration. 
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ministrator takes his place, and sues the corporation which re-
corded the wrongful transfers. The impulse to aid the defrauded 
widow and heirs is strong, and so is the court's desire to repair 
the damage done. 
If we look far enough, we may find some analogy for applying 
even the law of the state of fiduciary administration, which is 
usually the residence of the deceased stockholder and his bene-
ficiaries. One may cite Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company,126 where District of Columbia compensation law was 
applied in preference to that of Virginia, where the accident 
occurred. The Supreme Court declared, "A prime purpose of 
. the Act is to provide residents of the District of Columbia with· 
a practical and expeditious remedy for their industrial acci-
dents .... The District's legitimate interest in providing adequate 
workmen's compensation measures for its residents does not tum 
on the fortuitous circumstance of the place of their work Qr 
injury."127 
The transfer official's fear that the law of the state of fiduciary 
administration will be applied is particularly acute with respect 
to a group of states whose statutes provide that if an executor sells 
stocks without a court order or confirmation, the sale "shall be 
void," or that "no title shall pass thereby to the purchaser."128 
If the company makes a transfer which has not been approved 
by a court, and then is sued in a state which has such a law, it 
has a hard argument to make. If the sale was truly "void," the 
company is surely liable. To escape, the company must persuade 
the court that the statute is inapplicable between shareholder 
and company, or that it is extraterritorial and invalid as to trans-
fers in foreign corporations. Either argument goes against the 
words of the statute, and against the probable sympathies of the 
judge. 
120 330 U.S. 469 (1947). 
121 Id. at 476. 
128 In the following citations, STG means CCH STOCK TRANSFER GUIDE: Alaska: 
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §61-14-1, STG p. 55,004; Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
(1956) §14-599, STG p. 8303; California: Cal. Prob. Code (Deering, 1944) §755, STG p. 
9004; Florida: Fla. Stat. (1941) §733.23, STG p. 14,004; Idaho: Idaho Code (1948) §15-702: 
STG p. 16,002; Maryland: Md. Code Ann. (1951) c. 93, §306, STG pp. 24,001-24,002; 
Mississippi: Miss. Code (1942) §620, STG p. 28,003; Missouri: Mo. Stat Ann (1956) §473.487, 
STG p. 29,002; Montana: Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §91.2803, STG p. 30,002; Oklahoma: 
Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 58 §382, STG p. 40,003; South Carolina: S.C. Code (1952) 
§19-5-15, STG p. 44,003; South Dakota: S.D. Code (Supp. 1952) §35.1506, STG p. 45,003; 
Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1956) Tex. Prob. Code §339, STG p. 47,002; Wyoming: 
Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) §6-1702, STG p. 54,002. 
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A sad commentary on the competency of judges is implicit 
in the fear that they may apply the law of the state of fiduciary 
administration. Nevertheless, most transfer agents who simplify 
at all demand statutory protection in the fiduciary's state. 
Registered Bonds in the Conflict of Laws. All the 1957 simpli-
fication acts apply to registered bonds, as well as to stocks.m But 
the conflict of laws rules for bonds are quite different. Bonds are 
typically regarded as debts of the corporation, not as memberships 
in it.130 There is no modern rule that· a corporation's debts are 
governed by the state of incorporation; on the contrary, they 
:ire governed by the place of contracting, or by the place of per-
formance.131 Both of these places present practical difficulties. If 
the place of contracting governs, one must decide whether the 
debt is contracted where the bonds are delivered to the under-
writer, or by the underwriter to the investors. If the place of 
performance governs, there may be alternative places of pay-
ment (e.g., Wilmington, New York) and additional places where 
the duty to register ownership may be performed ( e.g., Boston, 
Chicago). 
The 1957 simplification acts have unanimously rejected all 
these confusing points of reference. The governing law is to be 
the place of incorporation.132 
This is all very well if the company happens to be sued in a 
state which has adopted the law. But what of the Delaware cor-
poration which has issued bonds in New York, payable there, 
but whose bonds have been wrongfully transferred by a transfer 
agent in Chicago~ and which is sued in North Carolina by the 
defrauded heir of a North Carolina estate? 
If the North Carolina judge reads his cases with care, I think 
he should apply the law of Illinois. The question is not the 
129 Massachusetts Commercial Code (Mass.) §8-102(1)(a). Model Fiduciaries Securities 
Transfer Act (Conn., Del., Ill.) §l(f), reproduced at p. 885 infra. The Pennsylvania 
Commercial Code [§8-102(1)(2)) is to the same effect. 
130 For a case in which the traditional distinctions ·between bonds and stock were 
employed to decide a tax question, see John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 
(1946). 
131 CONFLICT OF LAws RE.sTATEMENT §§311-376 (19!14). 
132 Mass. Commercial Code §8-106; Model Act (Del., lli.) §6; Model Act (Conn.) §5. 
The Pennsylvania Commercial Code purports to govern any transaction made or 
agreed to be made within the state, and to any security which has (ever?) been issued or 
transferred within the state. Pa. Commercial Code §1-105(4). This Napoleonic decree 
forcibly recalls Lord >Ellenborough's famous query, "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law 
to ,bind the whole world?" Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 at 194, 103 Eng. Rep. 546 
(1808). 
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validity of the bond (on which New York law might govern) 
but neglect to use care in transferring the bond. If the neglect is 
regarded as a tort, it took place in Illinois and is ruled by Illinois 
law.133 
The neglect may also be regarded as a breach of contract-
one of the obligations implied by a promise to pay a named and 
registered bondholder. Whether any such obligation has been 
broken is determined by the law of the place where it was to be 
performed, which is Illinois. If the contract contains various 
obligations, each obligation is to be separately judged by its own 
place of performance.134 American bond cases concerning defaults 
in payment of interest or principal concur in this rule.135 
However, the bond in question may have been transferrable 
alternatively in New York or Chicago; the place of performance is 
alternative. In this situation, such authority as exists concurs that 
by requesting registration of transfer at Chicago the holder has 
subjected his claim to Illinois law.136 
Following this analysis, we would conclude that an issuer is 
safe if the simplification law is in effect in the state of transfer 
on the books and (because the statutes so require) in the state 
of incorporation. 
Unfortunately, the rules of conflicts in relation to contracts 
are much more fluid than those applicable to shareholders' 
rights,137 and there are plenty of places for a judge to jump th~ 
track that we have laid out. Perhaps he prefers the rule that a 
contract is governed in its entirety by the law of the place of 
contracting, because this is the presumable intention of the 
parties.138 Perhaps he thinks that all duties are governed by the 
183 CONFLICT OF LAWS Rl!sTATEMENT §378 (1934); Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. 
Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 S. 803 (1892). 
134 CONFLICT OF LAws REsrATEMENT §358 (1934). Cf. id., §353; Louis-Dreyfus v. 
Paterson Steamships, Ltd., (2d Cir. 1930) 43 F. (2d) 824. 
135 Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens, (2d Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 993, 
cert. den. 299 U.S. 585 (1936); Thompson v. Lakewood City Development Co., 105 Misc. 
680, 174 N.Y.S. 825 (1919). 
136 Pan-Am. Securities Corp. v. Krupp A. G., 164 Mi,sc. 445, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 993 (1938), 
affd. 256 App. Div. 955, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 205 (1939). Cf. CoNFLicr OF LAws REsrATEMENT 
§356 (1934). 
137 CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD, AND REEsE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, 4th 
ed., 533 (1957): "The subject, Contracts, is the most confused one in conflict of laws." 
Similar observations have been made by an Englishman and a German. Morris, "The 
Eclipse of the Lex Loci Solutionis-A Fallacy Exposed," 6 VAND. L. REv. 505 (1953); 2 
RAllEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 274, 451 (1947). 
188 See Morris and Cheshire, "Proper Law of a Contract in the Conflict of Laws," 
56 L. Q. REv. 320 (1940); Nussbaum, "Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases Versus 
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place of the principal performance which is payment;139 if so, 
the "place of performance" becomes the place where payment 
was demanded.140 Or he may conclude that he is applying a 
standard of care which has never been defined and which must 
therefore be judged by the law of the forum.141 
This state of affairs may give a transfer official all kinds of 
worries. If he takes them seriously enough, he will refuse to 
simplify until appropriate statutes have been passed in all the 
states in which he could conceivably be sued. Happily, I have as 
yet discovered no examples of so extreme an attitude. 
The saving grace is that the issuer is probably under no duty 
under any state's law to inquire into the propriety of bond 
transfers. The doctrine that the issuer of stock has such an obliga-
tion has never yet been extended to the issuers of bonds. In its 
present state of disrepute it is unlikely to be. But even a judge 
who regards with favor the Taney doctrine142 would be unlikely 
to extend the same protection to bondholders. A corporation may· 
be regarded as a trustee for its shareholders much more plausibly 
than as a trustee for its creditors. In the Lowry case, Justice Taney 
derived the corporation's duty in part from the fact that it 
required all stock to be transferred on the books; the decision to 
register bonds is commonly optional with the holder. 
Putting together the improbability of being held at all, and 
the uncertainty of what law governs, transfer agents are likely to 
apply to registered bonds the same procedures which they apply 
to stocks. 
Choice of Law in Foreign Countries. Issuers and transfer 
agents have given no evidence yet of being concerned with law of 
countries other than the United States. But many American com-
panies do business abroad and have foreign investors; so the 
subject may be worth a moment's consideration. 
If any country outside the United States applies its own law 
to the situation, it is a safe guess that the security issuer will not 
be held liable. As is well known, English courts have repeatedly 
Restatement," 51 YALE L. J. 893 at 915-918 (1942); and see the works of Morris and Rabel 
cited in note 137 supra. 
139 See Badger -Machinery Co. v. United States Bank, 166 Wis. 18, 163 N.W. 188 
(1917), where the effect of negotiating a bond in New Mexico was governed by the law 
of Wisconsin, where the bond was payable. 
140 By analogy to Pan-Am Securities, note 136 supra, where the .bondholder's election 
to demand payment in Holland instead of in Germany made Dutch law applicable. 
141 CONFLICT OF LAws REsTATEJl!ENT §380 (1934). 
142 See note 2 supra. 
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repelled the suggestion that a security issuer must look out for 
the protection of equitable interests in the securities.143 This 
view would presumably be followed in other nations of the Com-
monwealth, where Justice Taney's reputation would add little 
to the intrinsic attractions of Lowry v. Commercial Bank.144 
In countries with other legal systems, we have no such direct 
evidence of what views courts would take. It seems inherently 
doubtful that any such duty would be imposed. Its whole basis is 
the concept of participation by a third party in a breach of trust-
a secondary development of Anglo-American trust law.14i. But 
the trust itself is a stranger to lands which lack the Anglo-Saxon 
legal tradition;146 liability for negligent participation in a breach 
of this unrecognized institution seems most unlikely. In the 
related institution of fiducia, a third party who buys from an 
erring fiduciary incurs no liability.147 
It is also unlikely that foreign countries will apply their own 
law to the suit of a purported shareholder against the corpora-
tion. For the doctrine is universally recognized that the relations 
of shareholder and corporation are to be determined by law which 
is personal to the corporation.148 
But here we encounter an interesting difference. While 
American judges consider the corporation's domicil to be the 
state which granted its charter, European countries generally 
refer to the location of the general executive oflices.149 So a Euro-
pean court, passing judgment on the suit of a shareholder against 
Ford Motor Company, would not in the first instance refer to 
the law of Delaware, but of Michigan. However, on discovery 
that Michigan would in tum refer the question to Delaware 
law, the law of Delaware would ultimately be applied, by the 
process known as renvoi.150 
143 Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jr. 55, 10 Eng. Rep. 891 (1796); Simpson v. 
Molson's Bank, [1895] A.C. 270; Gower, "Some Contrasts Between British and American 
Corporation Law,'' 69 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1369 (1956). 
144 Note 2 supra. 
145 Scott, "Participation in a Breach of Trust," 34 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 454 at 465-467 (1921). 
146 Bolgar, "Why No Trusts in the Civil Law?" 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 204 (1953); Hefti, 
"Trusts and Their Treatment in the Civil Law,'' 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 553 (1956). 
147 Hefti, "Trusts and Their Treatment in the Civil Law,'' 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 553 
at 559 (1956). 
148 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LA.ws-A COMPARATIVE STUDY 74 (1947). 
149 Id. at 31. Rabel uses the term "central office," which I have paraphrased as 
"general executive offices," on the supposition that the latter has more meaning to 
American readers. 
150 Id,. at 50. 
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A different result would follow if the general executive offices 
of a Delaware corporation were in Venezuela. A German court 
would apply the law of Venezuela in the first instance, and also 
in the last instance, because Venezuela apparently agrees with 
Germany that the law of the general executive offices governs in-
ternal corporate problems.151 However, there would still be little 
danger for the corporation, since it is fundamentally unlikely 
that Venezuela would consider that the corporation has any obli-
gation whatever to the owners of unrecorded interests in cor-
porate stocks. 
With respect to corporate bonds, it seems just as improbable 
as in the case of stocks that any foreign court would apply its own 
law to the controversy; or that, if it did, it would impose liability 
on the security issuer. European choice of law with respect to 
debt claims does differ somewhat from American choice of law; 
it has a much greater disposition to apply the law which the 
parties themselves intended, if they have made their intention 
known.152 Hence, any provision in the bond that it should be 
governed by the law of state of incorporation would probably 
be honored. 
When the parties have not signified their choice of law, Euro-
pean authorities are nearly as divided as Americans between the 
place of contracting and the place of performance.153 Since the 
place of contracting will be some American state, which pre-
sumably applies the law of the place of performance, we are again 
brought back to the place where the duty to transfer was right-
fully or wrongfully performed.154 So the ultimate law applied 
would probably be the same as if the case had started in an Ameri-
can court. 
I have spoken of European law, because a little is known of 
it. On technical questions of this sort, t suppose that judges in 
other parts of the world-such as Latin America and Asia, are 
likely to defer to European solutions if known to them. 
In summary, a contemplation of the law of foreign countries 
adds nothing to the danger of simplifying share transfers. Insofar 
as foreign courts decide differently than American courts would, 
their decisions are likely to favor the security issuers. 
What the Security Issuers Think About Conflicts. According 
1:;1 Ib;d . 
. 152 Id. at 368. 
153 Id. at 463. 
154 Id. at 480. 
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to the proportions of timidity and caution that enter into their 
temperaments, security issuers have a wide variety of choice as 
to the conflicts requirements of a simplification program. The 
issuer who has faith in the law as it is written should be satisfied 
with a simplification law in only one contact of the transaction-
the place of incorporation (for a stock). If he is a shade more 
cautious, he will demand two safe contacts-the state of incorpora-
tion and of transfer. If he regards law as no more certain than 
politics, he will demand three contacts, adding to the above the 
place of fiduciary administration. And if he suffers from a fear 
neurosis, he will refuse to simplify until proper laws are adopted 
in all the jurisdictions where he might conceivably be sued. 
For the transfer of bonds, even the boldest issuer will pre-
sumably require in the first instance a safe contact both for the 
place of transfer (because this is indicated by the normal choice 
of law rule) and for the place of incorporation (because this is 
the choice designated by the simplification statutes). In the next 
stage of timidity, he will demand protection also at the place of 
issue; and, if superabundantly cautious, the place of fiduciary 
administration. 'Finally, the neurasthenic will demand protec-
tion in every state where suit may be brought. 
Most Chicago transfer agents are now working on a three-
contact approach. They will simplify transfers if the state of 
incorporation and the state of fiduciary administration, as well 
as the state of registration, have adopted the Model Fiduciaries 
Securities Act. States with other simplification acts are treated like 
those which have no simplification acts at all.155 
Some of the Chicago agents have established a two-contact 
approach for small security holdings; they are satisfied to find 
the Model Act in the state of incorporation and in the state of 
registration (which for them is always Illinois), without requiring 
it also in the state of fiduciary administration.156 
One large Chicago corporation is said to have gone even 
farther, and to be permitting its out-of-state transfer agents to 
dispense with documentation, regardless of the state of fiduciary 
155 This is the practice "advised" in the SUGGESTED GUIDE FOR STOCK TRANSFER AGENTS 
UNDER ILLINOIS FIDUCL\RIES SECURITIES TRANSFER Acr, jointly issued under date of August 
26, 1957, by the Illinois Bar Association Committee on Simplification of Fiduciary 
Security Transfers, and the Chicago Corporate Fiduciaries Association Stock Transfer 
Committee. 
156 The companies consider this policy as highly experimental, and may discontinue 
it at any time in order to let time show what the effects have been. 
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administration. This company's conflict-of-laws hazard is mini-
mized by the fact that it does no business (and presumably can-
not be sued) outside Illinois.157 
The three-contact approach is the one in actual use, I am told, 
in Philadelphia and Wisconsin. Simplified transfers are made 
when all three contacts are within the state. In neither of these 
states has any recognition yet been given to recognition of the 
other as a safe contact for a simplified transfer. 
It is evident that the law of other states is a major factor in 
discouraging the simplification of security transfers. Although 
such fears are not groundless, they need not be placed on a par 
with fears of the law of the state of incorporation. If corporations 
have no faith whatever in courts, they should stop doing busi-
ness altogether. Since they consent to make some transfers, trust-
ing that the courts will not find the facts completely wrong, they 
might also make transfers in reliance on the law of the state of 
incorporation, trusting courts not to apply the law of the place 
of transfer. At least, they could disregard the law of the place of 
fiduciary administration, which could be applied only in open 
defiance of all known precedents. 
The issuer of securities, in establishing its transfer policies, 
needs to make a combined consideration of conflict-of-laws rules 
and substantive law rules. To facilitate this type of analysis, 
I have prepared a table which suggests possible considerations 
bearing on simplified transfers of the securities of executors and 
administrators. 
SAFE CONTACTS FOR SIMPLIFIED STOCK TRANSFERS 
on the order of executors and administrators 
Safe Contacts as States of Incorporation 
Satisfactory to highly cautious issuer: 




Satisfactory to reasonably cautious issuer: 





157 The company involved has refused to confirm this practice in writing, and does 
not wish to be identified in connection with it, but does not deny the statement. 
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Satisfactory only to a highly experimental issuer: 
All others 
Safe Contacts as States of Transfer on the Books: 
Satisfactory to highly cautious issuer: 
States in which issuer cannot be sued. 




Satisfactory to reasonably cautious issuer: 
881 





Satisfactory to reasonably bold issuer: 
Any other state ( on supposition that law of state of 
transfer is irrelevant). 
Safe Contacts as State of Fiduciary Administration 
Satisfactory to highly cautious issuer: 
States in which issuer cannot be sued. 









States in which executor or administrator has power 
of sale without court order or direction in will: 
Connecticut* Hawaii New York 
Delaware* Iowa North Dakota 
Massachusetts* Maine Rhode Island 
Pennsylvania* Minnesota Tennessee 
Wisconsin* Nebraska Utah 
New Hampshire Vermont 
New Jersey Virginia 
New Mexico West Virginia 
*already included in prior list. 
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Satisfactory to reasonably cautious 'issuer: 
States in which court order is required for sale, but 
















Satisfactory to reasonably bold issuer: 
States in which lack of court order or confirmation 




Florida South Carolina 
Idaho South Dakota 
Maryland Texas 
Mississippi Wyoming 
The Future of Simplification 
The seven scattered states which now have simplification acts 
will probably find additional companions in 1958 and 1959.1118 
The four enactments of 1957 testify to a gathering momentum. 
However, the executors and administrators who have been 
gasping for legislation may soon be gasping for a less bewildering 
variety of styles. At present, there are seven states with six varia-
tions of simplification laws distributed among them. It is already 
certain that transfer officials in some states distrust the simplifica-
tion acts of others; some even distrust their own acts. In only 
two states-Delaware and Illinois-is it clear that the transfer 
officials intend to recognize the effectiveness of the laws of any 
other state. 
111s As I write, the Model Fiduciaries Securities Transfer Act has been introduced 
in the 1958 sessions of the legislatures of New York, New Jersey and Michigan. 
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The extant competitors in the legislative race are presently 
two-the Uniform Commercial Code (1957 version) and the 
Model Fiduciaries' Securities Transfer Act. They are about to 
be joined by a third, the Uniform Act To Simplify Security 
Transfers.159 
The Uniform Commercial Code's excuse for existing is quite 
different from that of the other two. It is a comprehensive codi-
fication of the law governing commercial transactions. Simpli-
fication is one of four parts in one of eight articles. In order to 
obtain simplification by this route (assuming it to be an effective 
route), the legislature must accept a complete revision of its law 
of sales, negotiable instruments, bank collections, letters of credit, 
bills of lading, warehouse receipts, chattel mortgages, conditional 
sales, and incidental topics. 
The Model Act, by contrast, exists exclusively for the purposes 
of simplifying transfers. It has been injected into a scene already 
occupied by the Commercial Code because of evidence that the 
code's adoption would be successfully opposed in the states which 
are most important to stock transfer, 160 and that transfer agents 
would refuse to simplify transfers under it even if it were 
adopted.161 
The Uniform Act, now in draft, has the same basic objectives 
as the Model Act. The commissioners' reasons for launching 
another act with the same objectives are apparently mingled. On 
the simplest plane, they wish to help in a good cause, but demand 
a certain conformity to the style of other uniform laws. In addi-
tion, their editorial committee has various technical and termino-
logical differences with the sponsors of the Model Act. Finally, 
some of the commissioners are so deeply committed to the Uni-
form Commercial Code that they want every other uniform act 
to subscribe to its Alice-in-Wonderland vocabulary.162 
159 1956 HANDBOOK, 285. 
160 The act was rejected by the New York Law Revision Commission in 1955, and 
by the Indiana legislature in 1957. Because of known opposition, it has not been 
introduced in Illinois. 
161 See prior discussion as to effects of the code in Pennsylvania. I was orally informed 
by a group of transfer officials in July 1957 that when the Uniform Commercial Code 
was under consideration in New York in 1954, they ,had decided that its adoption would 
make no change in their transfer practices. 
l62Whether you are in Wonderland depends, of course, on which door you came 
in by. If you came in as a person who handles securities (as investor, broker, corporate 
secretary, or transfer agent), you think of securities as involving (1) a document labelled 
"assignment," which says "I hereby sell assign and transfer," (2) a handing over of 
certificates to a buyer, called "delivery," (3) a process of cancelling the old certificate, 
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Fortunately, the last motivation seems to be on the wane; 
meetings of some of the sponsors of the Model Act and of the 
Uniform Act held in October 1957 and January 1958 at the New 
York Stock Exchange seemed to bring the two groups closer to 
agreement on a common draft.163 If these groups succeed in 
unifying their efforts, it is most probable that a large majority 
of states will adopt the joint product within. a few years. Recip-
rocal recognition between states would follow, so that nation-
wide or nearly nation-wide simplification of transfers would be 
a reality by 1965. There will remain the states which adopt the 
Uniform Commercial Code, to which reciprocity recognition may 
be denied by the Model-Uniform Act states. But it is likely that 
the Commercial Code will eventually achieve recognition from 
transfer agents. If its 1957 form proves unacceptable, further 
changes can and must be made in it. 
It therefore seems likely that within five to ten years fiduci-
aries across the nation will be transferring their stock and regis-
tered bonds without copies of wills and court orders, and with-
out the lawyers' interpretations and supporting affidavits that are 
sometimes made necessary by the terms of the wills and orders. 
But this will not come to pass by the mere efflux of time. It will 
issuing a new one, and entering a new name on a stock ledger, all of which is called 
"transfer" and done by a "transfer agent," (4) the countersigning of the new certificate, 
and recording of serial numbers as a control on the transfer agent, done by a "registrar." 
When you read any of the forms of the Uniform Commercial Code, you find that 
step 1 is called "indorsement" even though it is not written on the back of the instrument 
(which you always thought was the meaning of "indorsement''); you find that step 2 
effects a "transfer" although a transfer agent has nothing to do with it; you find that 
step 3 is called "registration," although a registrar has nothing to do with it; and you 
find no word left for what a "registrar" does. 
However, if you approach from a different angle, the wording of the code may seem 
quite reasonable, because there is no use being technical about where you "indorse," 
and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act initiated the present use of "transfer" and "registra-
tion" some forty years ago. The Wonderland is among the investment people who keep 
using their words with nineteenth century meanings. 
163 This meeting consisted of the five members of the Special Committee on Uniform 
Simplification of Security Transfers Act, of the National Conference of Commissioners 
of Uniform State Laws, and 13 members of an "advisory committee,'' drawn from the 
American Bar Association committee, the Stock Exchange, the American Law Institute, 
the New York Stock Transfer Association, the Corporate Transfer Agents Association, 
and the American Society of Corporate Secretaries. The persons present at the October 
meeting were Robert Braucher (Cambridge), Alfred A. Buerger (Buffalo), Willard B. 
Luther (Boston), Karl N. Llewellyn (Chicago), Walter D. Malcolm (Boston), Francis T. 
Christy (New York), Alfred F. Conard (Ann Arbor), Austin Fleming (Chicago), John R. 
Haire (New York), Carlos L. Israels (New York), T. Stanley O'Brien (New York), Daniel 
Partridge, III (Washington), Samuel L. Rosenberry (New York), Eliot B. Thomas 
(P,hiladelphia), George -E. Wasko (New York), Joseph E. Williams (New York). 
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require an agreement among sponsoring groups on the legisla-
tion to be sponsored; it will require adoption by more than 40 
legislatures; it will require alert responsiveness of corporation 
officials to the possibilities of the new laws. 
The result will be a minor victory in the endless struggle 
which we of the legal and financial professions must wage to 
avoid strangling ourselves with red tape. 
Model Fiduciaries' Securities Transfer Act 
Be it enacted, etc .••• [insert appropriate enacting language for the particular state.] 
Section 1. Definitions. · 
In this Act, unless the context requires otherwise: 
(a) "Assigument" includes any written stock power, bill of sale, deed, declaration 
of trust or other instrument of transfer. 
(b) "Beneficial interest" includes the interest of a decedent's legatee, distributee, heir 
or creditor, of a beneficiary under a trust, of a ward of a beneficial owner of a security 
registered in the name of a nominee, or of a minor owner of a security registered in the 
name of a custodian, or any similar interest. 
(c) "Corporation" means a corporation (private, public or municipal), association or 
trust organized or created under the laws of this State and issning a security subject to 
this Act, and includes the transfer agents and registrars of any of its securities. 
(d) "Fiduciary" includes an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, committee, 
conservator, curator, tutor, custodian or nominee. 
(e) "Person" includes a firm or corporation. 
(f) "Security" includes any share of stock, bond, debenture, note or other security 
of a corporation which is registered as to ownership on the books of the corporation. 
(g) "Transfer" means a change on the books of a corporation in the registered owner-
ship of a security. 
Section 2. Assigument to a fiduciary. 
A corporation making a transfer of a security upon assignment by the registered 
owner to a person described as a fiduciary in the assignment or known by the corporation 
to be a fiduciary is not bound to inquire into the existence, extent, or correct description 
of the fiduciary relationship, and thereafter, until the corporation receives written notice 
to the contrary, it may assume without inquiry that the registered owner continues 
to be the fiduciary. 
Section 3. Assignment by a fiduciary. 
A corporation making a transfer of a security upon assignment by a fiduciary 
(a) may assume without inquiry that the assignment, even though to the fiduciary 
himself or to his nominee, is within bis authority and capacity and is not in breach 
of his fiduciary duties, 
(b) may assume without inquiry that the fiduciary bas complied with the laws of 
the state having jurisdiction of the fiduciary relationship, including any laws requiring 
the fiduciary to obtain court approval of the transfer, and 
(c) is not charged with notice of and is not bound to obtain or examine any court 
record or any recorded or unrecorded document relating to the fiduciary relationship 
or the assignment, even though the record or document is in its possession, except that, 
if the security is not registered in the name of the fiduciary, the corporation shall obtain 
a copy of a document showing his appointment and, if court appointed, certified by 
the clerk of the appointing court within sixty days before the date of transfer, but the 
corporation is charged with notice of only that part of the document which provides 
for the appointment. 
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Section 4. Adverse claims. 
If a person having or asserting a claim of beneficial interest adverse to the transfer 
of a security from a fiduciary delivers written notice of the claim to the corporation 
before the transfer, the corporation shall promptly notify the claimant by registered mail 
of the presentation of the security for transfer. The corporation shall withhold the 
transfer for fifteen days after sending the notice and shall then make the transfer unless 
it is restrained by a court order. 
Section 5. Non-liability of corporation. 
A corporation making a transfer of a security under this Act incurs no liability 
to any person. 
Section 6. Application. 
This Act applies to every claim of beneficial interest in a security issued by a 
corporation organized under the laws of this State regardless of the place of delivery 
or transfer, regardless of the location or domicile of the person asserting the claim, and 
regardless of the location of the certificate or other instrument representing the security 
or of the assignment. 
Section 7. Tax obligations. 
This Act shall not be construed to affect any obligation of a corporation with respect 
to estate, inheritance, succession or other taxes imposed by the laws of this state. 
Section 8. Repeal. 
The following acts or parts of acts are repealed: [List acts or parts of acts of the 
enacting state which conflict with, or overlap, the model fiduciaries' securities transfer 
act. In particular, list section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, if in effect in the state. 
It is not necessary to refer to or repeal any part of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.] 
Section 9. This Act may be cited as the "[Insert name of state] Fiduciaries' Securities 
Transfer Act." 
Section 10. Effective date. 
This Act shall take effect on .................. . 
